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ARTICLES
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: A CURRENT ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND TRUST LAW SOLUTIONS
Roy M. ADAMs*
T IS THE PURPOSE of this article to chronicle and analyze the process
by which constitutional and trust law have blended together in the
charitable trust field. The questions to be posed and answered are es-
sentially these: Can a settlor expect racial and religious restrictions in a
charitable trust to be allowed to operate? If such restrictions may oper-
ate, under what conditions and circumstances? If not, why not, and
what will happen to the trust property thereafter?
It will be seen that whenever the courts find state participation in a
discriminatory charitable trust, the exclusionary trust features are held to
work a denial of equal protection, in contravention of the fourteenth
amendment,' and must cease to operate. The state action concept is
not wielded sparingly; peripheral governmental involvement is often
enough to necessitate the dismantling of exclusionary trust instructions.
Generally, the trust property will then be preserved for charitable pur-
poses through application of the doctrines of cy pres or deviation, unless
the testator has unmistakably manifested an intention that a gift-over
or lapse occur in the event the discrimination is disallowed.
The significance of current treatment of racial and religious dis-
crimination in charitable testamentary trusts is best understood when
contrasted with prior practice. Current trends may surprise lawyers
who have not had recent occasion to review this subject, but a close
scrutiny of the enduring precepts of charitable trust law demonstrates
a consistency between contemporary judicial decisions and their histori-
cal foundation. Indeed, the assault on exclusionary trusts could legiti-
mately have been mounted by trust law itself although, as will be dis-
cussed below, reliance on the state action concept more readily facilitates
saving the trust for charity.
I. DEFINITION AND HISTORY OF THE CHARITABLE TRUST
Initially, an attempt should be made to define a charitable trust.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts presents a characterization that,
in its simplicity, is more beguiling than informative:
A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
SB.A., Univ. of Delaware; J.D., Chicago- Kent; LL.M., Northwestern Univ.; Member,
Illinois Bar; Adjunct Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law.
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create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charita-
ble purpose.2
Basically, this explains that a charitable trust is like any other trust, but
intended for a charitable purpose, leaving incomplete the elusive task
of identifying "charitable purpose." Ultimately, charitable purpose has
become whatever, at a given moment, has been publicly acknowledged
as a proper exercise in generosity for communal good. But first the fun-
damental concept of creating trust relationships for such charitable uses
had to gain acceptance.
Once a matter of dispute, the origin of the charitable trust in the
common law is now believed to predate the Statute of Charitable Uses
enacted in England in 1601.3 Most recipients were religious persons
or bodies that took land under official disfavor and could be made to
forfeit their gift to the feudal overlord, or to the Crown, unless license
were obtained to retain it. Consequently, the practice arose of private
parties holding land for the use of religious parties, but the Chancellor
would not always enforce these uses. To supplement the original pro-
ceeding in equity, the Statute of Charitable Uses then created a new
remedy which authorized the Chancellor to establish a commission
that would investigate abuses of charitable donations and issue decrees.
Those who believed they had been injured by the commission's pro-
nouncements could petition the Chancellor for redress. The commission
procedure eventually lost popularity and was seldom used when the
Statute, except for its preamble, was repealed in 1888. 4
It was in the preamble that the Statute attempted to define a chari-
table use, presenting a list of purposes for which property had previous-
ly been appropriately donated.5 The list was not intended to be final
and analogous uses were upheld as properly benevolent.6 In this re-
gard, the Statute's drafters showed an appreciation for the recurring
difficulty of codifying the charitable use. What constitutes charity must
vary with time and place; there is no immutable formula that can as-
sure that generosity will fulfill contemporary notions of public good
when consensus on both "public" and "good" is forever evanescent.
An operational definition (a catalog of what is being done), coupled
with a policy that untried uses will have an opportunity to demonstrate
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TnusTs § 348 (1959).
STAT. 43 Euz. I, c. 4 (1601).
4Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vicr., c. 42.
5 STAT. 43 ELIz. I, c. 4 (1601) stated:
[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick
and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars
in universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-
banks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for or
towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages
of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handi-
craftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemption of prisoners
or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of
fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.
6 4 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTs § 368.1, at 2857 (3d ed. 1967).
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their merit, gives greater flexibility than a prescriptive definition of
what should be done, unless the latter is sufficiently broad to embrace
changing societal needs as they can be identified. As Professor Scott
has said:
[I]t would seem that even the Parliament cannot frame a defi-
nition which would successfully include what should be included
and exclude what should not be included. Matters of grave
policy like this cannot be solved by definition. 7
Accordingly, many of the charitable purposes enumerated in the Statute
of Uses have since become governmental functions (repair of bridges,
ports), are performed by private noncharitable organizations such as
labor unions (aid and help of young tradesmen), or are handled by shift-
ing partnerships of government, charitable groups, and private indus-
try. Others (for marriages of poor maids) have disappeared altogether
as public concerns.
Mistakenly believing that the charitable trust was a product of the
Statute of Charitable Uses, seven states formerly refused to recognize
such trusts8 because the Statute had been repealed or had never been
adopted in those states. Thus in 1819, the United States Supreme Court,
in Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors,9
did not enforce a testamentary trust created on behalf of a religious as-
sociation for the education of Baptist youth. It was the view of Chief
Justice Marshall that the testator's plan failed as a private trust for want
of a definite beneficiary and could not be maintained as a charitable
trust because the Statute of Charitable Uses had been repealed in Vir-
ginia. But when later research proved that charitable trusts were not
dependent upon the Statute for their legitimacy, the Supreme Court
reversed itself in Vidal v. Girard's Executors,10 the first case in what
would eventually be more than a century of litigation over the will of
Stephen Girard.
The Vidal opinion still did not presage unanimous acceptance of elee-
mosynary trusts in America; New York withheld its imprimatur until
passage of the Tilden Act in 1893.11 The courts of that state had been
unwilling on policy grounds to validate benevolent trusts, expressing a
preference in Bascom v. Albertson12 for gifts to charitable corporations
which were felt to be more amenable to control through the state's
power to prevent incorporation. Allowing any person the right to create
a trust that could last in perpetuity was considered unwise.
Id. § 368, at 2856.
8 Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The statutes that eventually validated charitable trusts in these states are compiled in A.
ScoTr, supra note 6, § 348.3, at 2785 n.9.
9 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
10 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
11 N.Y. LAWS of 1893, ch. 701, as amended, N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1
(McKinney 1967) and N.Y. PEas. PRop. LAW § 12 (McKinney 1962).
12 34 N.Y. 584 (1866).
1976]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
II. THE CHARITABLE TRUST AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY
The charitable trust is today welcome in all fifty states, but its
gradual adoption in some jurisdictions, as well as its historical roots both
preceding and subsequent to the Statute of Charitable Uses, unmistak-
ably demonstrates that it exists at the sufferance of the community so
long as it furthers societal ends and is not simply an emolument of
private ownership of property. The existence of the testamentary char-
itable trust results from a balancing of conflicting public policies, for it
inherently creates the disutility of dead hand control, restricting the
alienability of property by those who survive the testator. 13 From this
perspective, the burden of proof shifts to the testator to show why his
or her post-mortem instructions should be carried out by society for
the potentially unlimited duration permitted charitable trusts. This is
not to suggest that the charitable trust is disfavored - the truth is pre-
cisely opposite - but the allowance of such a trust is a policy decision,
a conscious community choice to permit perpetual dead hand control
of property when the purpose of that control is of greater benefit to
society than preservation of alienability for the testator's survivors.
Specifically, the purpose of control must be charitable, i.e., it must en-
hance a contemporary concept of public good.
The question then arises: Is it ever in the public good to encourage
racial or religious discrimination? Irrespective of constitutional require-
ments, this question is one that might have been customarily posed by
trust law itself in fitting cases; benevolent trusts have always faced the
litmus test of charitable purpose. This moment of threshold inquiry is
a proper occasion to decide whether "charity" contemplates, for exam-
ple, a hospital open only to whites. For too long it was simply assumed
that the benefits to public health that would accrue from such a trust
would outweigh the damage wrought to the excluded group. This as-
sumption, however, is of questionable validity in light of the Supreme
Court's conclusions in Brown v. Board of Education14 regarding the ef-
fects of prejudice on the disadvantaged group. The Court's observations
are instructive:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferi-
ority of the Negro group.' 5
13 In any civilized society, there is no escape from the dead hand. In a sense we
live by it. Our literature, our art, our architecture, our science, our religion, all
are built upon the achievements of dead men. But the dead band should not rule
us. Just so, our property institutions must be shaped in part by the dead hand.
But working compromises must be found, whereby the dead are forever barred
from withholding the scepter from the band of the living.
L. SIMES, PUBLIC PoLIcY AND THE DEAD HAND 140 (1955).
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15 Id. at 494. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), it was
claimed that discrimination also harms members of the dominant social group. The Traffi-
cante plaintiffs, suing under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et. seq.,
[Vol. 25:1
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Transposing the Brown findings to the charitable trust context, it is at
the very least arguable that the burdens of society will not be lessened,
on balance, by an otherwise eleemosynary trust which by its language
and effect inflicts social and psychic harm upon a racial group and in-
escapably upon the entire community.
Subjecting any charitable trust that bears racial restrictions to a
social cost-benefit analysis is especially fitting in view of the indulgent
treatment these trusts receive. The community makes certain tax exemp-
tions and other support mechanisms available to the charitable trust
that are not similarly offered to private trusts.
Among the benefits bestowed, for example, are those resulting from
the favored position of charitable trusts under various tax laws.16
Certain of these advantages are enjoyed by the charities themselves:
Property held by charities and used for charitable ends is generally
exempt from local property taxes; income charities receive from invested
funds is not subject to federal income tax, provided the income is not
derived from actual operation of an unrelated business.' 7 Advantages
also accrue to the benevolent donor. Charitable gifts are deductible
from the donor's income up to a maximum of 50 percent of adjusted
gross income.18 Moreover, federal estate 9 and gift20 tax laws allow a
full 100 percent deduction for philanthropic donations to qualified char-
ities under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Besides the tax benefits, there are other differences in treatment be-
claimed that they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage as a result of living
in a "white ghetto" (their apartment complex was over 99 percent white-occupied, al-
legedly due to the practices of the owners of the complex).
10 But certain of these benefits will no longer be automatically awarded when the
applicant is practicing racial exclusion. The all-white private academies established
throughout the state of Mississippi to evade the consequences of desegregation of public
schools have been denied tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service. Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). The deductibility of contributions to such
schools has also been withdrawn. In Green, the three-judge panel adopted the Internal
Revenue Service's construction of applicable Internal Revenue Code provisions - an-
nounced after the litigation had begun - to the effect that when an ostensibly charitable
institution was nonetheless frustrating federal policy on racial discrimination, it would not
be afforded tax advantages.
The individual philanthropist cannot be indulged in his own vagaries as to what is
charitable; he must conform to some kind of norm, else he cannot obtain subsidy
or tax exemption. Similarly, the general principle of a "desire to benefit one's
own kind" is aa acceptable incentive to philanthropy as applied to a wide range of
causes. But it takes on a different and unacceptable hue when it is manifested as
racial discrimination. We are persuaded that there is a declared Federal public
policy against support for racial discrimination in education which overrides any
assertion of value in practicing private racial discrimination, whether ascribed to
philosophical pluralism or divine inspiration for racial segregation.
Id. at 1163.
In Peoples-Merchant Trust Co. v. Schneider, 4 Ohio App. 2d 52, 211 N.E.2d 93 (1964),
a gift in trust to create a scholarship fund for Catholic boys was denied exemption from
succession taxes on the ground that the religious restriction prevented the trust from being
"for purposes only of public charity."
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-14. See Sugarman & Pomeroy, Business Income of
Exempt Organizations, 46 VA. L. REv. 424 (1960).
"S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(3).
'9 Id. § 2055.
20 Id. 2522.
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tween private and charitable trusts which tend to aid the latter. Al-
though private trusts are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, or
the rule against remoteness of vesting,21 charitable trusts are ex-
empted in some situations.22 Private trusts are also not permitted to
accumulate funds indefinitely by using income to enlarge the trust
principal rather than paying the income to the beneficiaries;23 charita-
ble trusts, by virtue of their unlimited duration, can accumulate income
for extended periods, though usually under the supervision of a court
ready to apply a reasonableness standard. 24 Whereas a private trust
must either designate definite beneficiaries or provide a method by
which they can accurately be identified, the specific identity of a char-
itable trust's beneficiaries can be, and indeed must be, uncertain.2 5
A consequence of this beneficiary indefiniteness is that the states' at-
torneys general, augmented by district and county attorneys in a few juris-
dictions,26 are charged with enforcement of these trusts.27 Additional-
21 J. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUIrIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942). The Rule requires
a contingent interest to vest, if at all, no later than 21 years after some life in being at the
time the interest is created. Nearly every state follows the Rule and the effect of violating
it is that the contingent interest is void.
22 Najarian, Charitable Giving and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 70 DICK. L. REV.
455, 458 (1966). A gift to one charity may be followed by a contingent gift-over to a
second charity even though the gift-over will not necessarily occur during the Rule's time
limit. Because the beneficial interest is vested in the public, a charitable trust may exist
indefinitely. Restraint upon alientation of property is tolerated because the property is
committed to eleemosynary ends by the terms of the trust instrument. If, however, the
gift goes first to a noncharitable donee and then goes over to a charity, it must vest within
the time limit set by the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. at 464.
21 See, e.g., In re Wheelock Estate, 401 Pa. 193, 164 A.2d 1 (1960). The limitation is
often the same as the perpetuities period - ownership of the accumulations must be vested
in someone within a life in being plus 21 years, although a few states vary from this. See
generally G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRaUSTEs §§ 341 - 60 (2d ed. 1964).
24 See, e.g., St. Paul's Church v. Attorney Gen., 168 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231 (1895);
Estate of James, 414 Pa. 80, 199 A.2d 275 (1964); N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 16 (McKinney
1962); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTS LAW 9 9.21 (McKinney 1967); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 442 (1944); A. ScoTr, supra note 6, 9 401.9, at 3167 n.4.
25 This is not to say that the trust instructions must be so vague or so broad that the
objects of the settlor's generosity would be indiscernible. It is enough that the trust serve
a charitable purpose and that the class of potential beneficiaries be large enough to satisfy
the courts that the community as a whole will benefit from performance of the trust.
See, e.g., Harrison v. Baker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937) (trust for retired
employees of a defunct corporation); Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, 6 N.E.2d 131 (1936)
(trust for the benefit of survivors of a particular tragedy); In re Pattberg, 282 App. Div.
770, 123 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (trust for the unemployment fund of a labor union
local). See generally A. ScoT-r, supra note 6, § 375, at 2938.
At the same time, certain indefinite philanthropic gifts have also received charitable
trust status because the courts are assured some acceptable charitable purpose will be
served. See, e.g., In re Voegtly, 396 Pa. 90, 151 A.2d 593 (1959) (purposes to be chosen
by trustee); In re Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150 (1938) ("to charity"); Boyd v.
Frost Nat'l Bank, 145 Tex. 206, 196 S.W.2d 497 (1946) (charities to be chosen by trustee).
21 People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill. App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 794 (1945); In re
Powers' Estate, 362 Mich. 222, 106 N.W.2d 833 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.251 (1964).
27 See Gray, STATE ArORNEY GENERAL - GUARDIAN OF PUBLIC CHARrnES???, 14
CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 236 (1965); Comm. on Charitable Trusts, Standards for Supervision
of Charitable Trusts, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 154 (1968); Note, The Enforcement
of Charitable Trusts in America: A History of Changing Social Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV.
435 (1968); Note, Charitable Trust Enforcement in Virginia, 56 VA. L. REV. 716 (1970).
Whether the attorney general's role is authorized by statute (some states have adopted
the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (1954), e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss1/4
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ly, when a charitable trust is incapable of being carried out or continued
as initially directed by the settlor, the court can use the doctrine of cy
pres28 to preserve the trust by redirecting it to another charitable use.
29
When a private trust is in this situation a court is limited to authorizing
only a "deviation"30 from the trust instructions in order to sustain the
ttust.3' A final benefit in a diminishing number of states grants char-
itable trustees some degree of immunity against liability for torts com-
mitted by agents and employees of the trust in the course of their em-
ployment.32  Before bestowing these various benefits and tax advan-
ch. 14, §§ 51-64 (1961); see Kutner & Koven, Charitable Trust Legislation in the Several
States, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 411 (1966)), or judicial precedent, see e.g., Brown v. Memorial Nat'l
Home Foundation, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d 118 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 943
(1959), the concept of enforcement by a governmental attorney predates the Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601. See A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 391, at 3002.
There has been some disenchantment with the record established by the attorneys gener-
al, whose offices have seldom ranked enforcerhent of charitable trusts high on their lists of
priorities. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1005-06 n.101 (1957). Public registry of charitable gifts and
periodic accounting have been required in some states. See A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 391,
at 3002 nn.12 & 13. Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service polices the activities of
tax-exempt benevolent organizations and requires annual reports. INT. REV. COoE OF 1954,
§§ 6033, 6034, 6104.
There is a dispute whether enforcement is the sole province of the attorney general.
Among other parties who have been granted standing to enforce a charitable trust have
been trustees challenging the conduct of co-trustees, see Holt v. College of Osteopathic
Physicians & Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964), and persons
with a direct and defined interest in proper performance of the trust, see Cannon v.
Stephens, 18 Del. Ch. 276, 159 A. 234 (1932), Northwestern Univ. v. Wesley Memorial
Hosp., 290 I11. 205, 125 N.E. 13 (1919). Settlors have generally not been given standing to
enforce their charitable trusts, though Wisconsin grants this right by statute. WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 701.10 (1969). Intervenors may be permitted to join an action along with the attorney
general. See Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968), aff'd 396 U.S. 435
(1970).
Enforcement proceedings are not the only means by which philanthropic trusts come to
court. See, e.g., In re Estate of Vanderhoofven, 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1970)
(will contest); Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of Clayton Coll., 461 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1969)
(trustees seeking changes in instructions); Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del.
Ch. 1973) (trustees seeking initial instructions); In re Girard's Estate, 356 Pa. 548, 127
A.2d 287 (1956) (direct constitutional challenges to trust restrictions); Wooten v. Fitz-
Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (petitions by administrators for construction
and interpretation of testamentary instruments).
Similarly, there is dispute whether the attorney general, on behalf of the people, is always
a necessary party plaintiff or defendant whenever a charitable trust comes before the courts.
Usually the attorney general must be involved, if only nominally, while other named parties
undertake the litigation. In re Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal. 2d 248, 363 P.2d 875, 14 Cal. Rptr.
643 (1961). Contra, Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, 30 Del. Ch. 330, 61 A.2d 110 (1948);
Rohlff v. German Old People's Home, 193 Neb. 636, 10 N.W.2d 686 (1943). It is generally
thought that the more indispensable the attorney general's participation, the more the
charitable trust may be regarded as a public entity.
2s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tmus'rs § 399 (1959); see note 120, infra.
" So long as the testator has demonstrated a general intention to dedicate the property
to charitable purposes, the court will divert the trust property to a benevolent enterprise that
is as similar as is practicable to the settlor's original scheme.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TuSrs § 381 (1959); see note 155, infra.
31 Deviation accomplishes a changein administrative detail, but cannot be resorted to
when the essential purpose of the trust is frustrated. See discussion accompanying notes
155-59, infra.
32 See, e.g., Thompson v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 279 Ala. 314, 184 So. 2d 825 (1966);
Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hosp., 349 Mass. 765, 208 N.E.2d 232 (1965). Contra, President &
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tages upon a racially exclusive trust, it would be well to consider that
the law may thereby be making discrimination even more effective
when it occurs in the name of charity than when it occurs privately.
Yet the road for the charitably inclined is not without its "chuck
holes." At the same time that charitable contributions are encouraged
and facilitated by the aforementioned devices and exemptions, there are
countervailing public interests that are expressed in some jurisdictions
through limitations on benevolent giving. Several states3 have provi-
sions that restrict or prevent charitable testamentary dispositions in ex-
cess of a certain proportion of the decedent's estate or contained in a
will executed during a specified time period immediately prior to
death.34  The intention of such limitations is twofold: to deter over-
reaching by charitable solicitors under circumstances when the potential
donor is particularly susceptible to such requests and to protect the testa-
tor's family from depletion of the estate.35  The existence of these stat-
utes underscores the conflicting policy considerations that bear upon the
charitable bequest.3 6
III. TRUST LAW WEAPONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION:
AN INITIAL ExPosuRE
Having surveyed mechanisms that reinforce and others that inhibit a
charitable trust, one is returned to the question of whether the acknowl-
edged national rejection of racial and religious discrimination in famous
Supreme Court cases and acts of Congress should take precedence over
the policy that welcomes charitable contribution.17  The fact remains
Directors of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Flagiello v.
Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
33 A state-by-state review of each of the ten jurisdictions imposing such restrictions
appears in Comm. on Succession, Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5 REAL
PROP., PRoB. & TRUST J. 290, 301-06 (1970).
34 Pennsylvania also controls inter vivos gifts, thus partially thwarting circumvention of
the statutes. PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, § 6115 (Supp. 1975).
31 In other states these same objectives can be achieved by the common law concepts
of undue influence and testamentary incapacity. There are also related legislative schemes,
such as "forced heir" statutes guaranteeing members of the deceased's family a certain
share of the estate, regardless of testamentary instructions to the contrary, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (1961), or a set percentage upon renunciation of the will, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 3, § 16 (1961). The "augmented estate" concept embodied in N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUST LAw § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967), enlarges the estate to include certain inter vivos
transfers by the deceased.
36 It is instructive that these statutory restrictions on charitable donation also apply
to outright gifts, which have greater weight on the policy scale because they do not involve
the disutility of dead hand control, as do charitable trusts. For an excellent summary of
arguments pro and con regarding the value of the testamentary prerogative see Clark,
Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE
L.J. 979 (1957).
37 The question presupposes that both policies cannot coexist and that a significant
number of charitable donors would be so frustrated by obstructions to discrimination or by
the general notion of restraints on their donative prerogative, that necessary sums will be
diverted from charitable ends. There is no hard evidence to support or refute this con-
tention. It would seem reasonable to assume, however, that donors will continue to be at-
tracted by the tax advantages associated with philanthropy.
Those for whom discrimination is the first priority may find acceptable donees becoming
increasingly scarce, whether due to changing attitudes or because discrimination can induce
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss1/4
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that exclusionary charitable trusts have not been dealt with by a thresh-
old refusal to classify such trusts as charitable. This is not necessarily
unfortunate, for to do so would mean the irrevocable loss of the trust
property for public purposes and would prevent the utilization of trust
law devices to remove racial limitations and still salvage the trust for
the benefit of the community.
No trust, public or private, can be dedicated to illegal ends or ends
contrary to public policy,38 nor can there be improper conditions im-
posed upon trusts intended for otherwise acceptable purposes. A trust
solely for prohibited purposes will fail,3 9 whereas one burdened by un-
enforceable conditions can operate with the conditions deleted.40 It
would be consistent with principles of trust law to declare, wherever
reasonable, any color-conscious trust instructions to be void conditions
contrary to public policy. The proposed result would be that "the bene-
ficiary takes under the will as if no conditions had been annexed to the
gift to him, or as if he had complied with the void condition."
41
It is one thing to characterize exculsionary trusts as undeserving of
the special status of the charitable trust. It is going one step further
to say that racially discriminatory trust directions are always fully con-
trary to public policy (regardless of state action) and therefore voidable.
the loss of either government contracts or community goodwill, or the imposition of civil
or criminal liability. At a session entitled "Labor, Management and the Public Interest"
sponsored by the National Conference of Christians and Jews on April 3, 1974, Robert D.
Lilley, president of American Telephone and Telegraph Co., the nation's largest private
employer, observed: "It seems certain that the business community in the United States
will continue to feel official pressure to achieve a race and sex balance in the national
work force, and feel it for some time to come." Mr. Lilley also said: "Finally, there
has to be acknowledgement of the foundation fact that equality in employment is inexor-
able simply because it is right." Another speaker, Martin Farmer, affirmative action
manager of the First National Bank of Chicago, said: "Management is motivated these
days in the equal employment field because of dollars - (fear of) damage to its corporate
image and the loss of business opportunity." Chicago Sun-Times, April 4, 1974, at 27,
col. 1.
31 See A. ScoTT, supra note 6, §§ 60-62.9, at 570, for a discussion of cases illustrating
which ends are illegal and against public policy.
39 E.g., Bettinger v. Bridenbecker, 63 Barb. 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
40 In re Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.2d 658 (1939); In re Sterne's Estate, 147
Misc. 59, 263 N.Y.S. 304 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
41 In re Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 469, 18 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1939). In In re Sterne's
Estate, 147 Misc. 59, 263 N.Y.S. 304 (Sur. Ct. 1933), it was found that a trust for the benefit
of nonprofit hospitals carried terms that would cause fee-splitting by physicians. The latter
provision was dropped as a void condition, while the trust became otherwise effective.
Sterne also declared that it was immaterial whether the condition was subsequent or prece-
dent. Id. at 308.
Certainly, there could be cases in which this would not be a fitting precedure, primarily
because a discriminatory provision had been so tightly woven into the trust that only by the
most strenous construction could it be regarded as a separable condition. An extreme
example would be a trust to finance research to develop a means of increasing the incidence
of sickle cell anemia. The trust should simply fail. But a trust to finance research facilities
for white medical students could only be properly salvaged by removing the white-only
restriction as a condition contrary to public policy, while still establishing a place for re-
search by students of any color. In Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), the court simply denominated "white" to be an "unenforceable word" in the
trust instrument and, relying on its general equitable powers, deleted it. (There was a
suggestion that state action was present in Wooten, but this was never clarified nor,
apparently, important to the outcome of the case.)
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Obviously, there are important differences between returning the trust
property to the decedent's estate (the effect of withholding charity status
from a trust) and passing that property on for societal use, minus some of
the testator's expressed wishes (the proposed result of voiding condi-
tions). The latter action conjures livelier visions of governmental in-
trusion into private affairs.
Actually, courts have rendered unmistakably punitive decisions when
the prohibited trust purposes have been particularly opprobrious. When
trusts have been intended to perpetrate fraud upon creditors, 42 induce
crime 43 or immorality,44 suppress prosecution,45 or encourage divorce,
46
judges have, upon failure of the trust, directed trust property toward
the "cleanest hands" available rather than return it to the settlor or his
estate. These "equitable distributions" have apparently been founded
on the premise that the settlor, having abused the dispositive preroga-
tive, has forfeited the prior right to determine the property's use. If
equity courts can exercise these powers for the benefit of creditors, it
is worth considering to what degree the nation's commitment to racial
equality should also activate equity's hand to reform charitable trusts
tainted by racial discrimination. In some circumstances, unequal treat-
ment is as much a statutory illegality 47 as other activities, the encourage-
ment of which has caused trust failure (e.g., perjury, adultery). In the
event of a trust that would, say, induce a hospital to violate federal
civil rights statutes by denying admission to minority persons in order to
obtain the trust property, the court could properly direct the trust corpus
as equity dictated. 48
IV. STATE ACTION: CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION FOR
DISCRIMINATION IN TRusTs
The majority of courts are not relying on trust law or general equit-
able powers to upset racial barriers in eleemosynary trusts. The domi-
nant trend is to find conflict with the fourteenth amendment which re-
moves the racial restrictions and then turn to equity to determine what
to do with the trust. There are certain advantages to using the state
action concept rather than employing trust law itself to overturn racially
exclusionary trusts.
Trust law can continue to operate as before, drawing upon the
42 E.g., MacRae v. MacRae, 37 Ariz. 307, 294 P. 280 (1930); Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183
Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947);
Pattison v. Pattison, 301 N.Y. 65, 92 N.E.2d 890 (1950).
43 See A. ScoTr, supra note 6, §§ 60-62.9, at 570.
44 E.g., Dannells v. United States Nat'l Bank, 172 Ore. 213, 138 P.2d 220 (1943).
15 See Woodall v. Peden, 274 Ill. 301, 113 N.E. 608 (1916); Bettinger v. Bridenbecker,
63 Barb. 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
46 Giddings v. Giddings, 167 Ore. 504, 114 P.2d 1009 (1941).
47 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1970).
4 If a gift-over or reverter to the testator's estate were present and ready to operate
upon failure of the primary, discriminatory purpose, it might be that the trust property would
pass in accordance with those alternative provisions. REsTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TRuST
§ 401(1) (1959). If the alternative donee were another charity the result would be salutary;
otherwise, the courts should implement their preference for retaining property for public use.
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strength of precedent developed over many years. There is no necessity
to remodel familiar trust principles to make them conscious of color be-
cause the equal protection doctrine will act from the "outside" to re-
move the offensive provisions. In addition, the doctrine of equal protec-
tion is itself time-honored. From past adjudication in diverse situations,
a doctrine has emerged by which the importation of equal protection
into fresh territory - here, charitable trust law - may be regulated.
Lawyers and judges thus have preexisting standards to consult for guid-
ance in the particular situations that confront them. Moreover, find-
ing that a charitable trust, as created by the settlor, will run afoul of
the equal protection clause does not necessarily prevent public use of the
trust property. Frustration of administrative details or specific charita-
ble schemes will only prove fatal to a benevolent trust if the court con-
cludes that the doctrines of deviation and cy pres cannot be utilized
under the existing circumstances to salvage the trust for the benefit of
the community. Recent decisions indicate that charitable trusts seldom
fail after exclusionary instructions are omitted.
It was settled in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts,49
that when the state is involved in management of charitable trusts they
must be in conformity with fourteenth amendment requirements. Thus,
in this case, when black applicants were denied admission to Girard
College on the basis of racial restrictions in the school's founding trust
instrument, the discriminatory provisions were declared unconstitution-
al violations of the fourteenth amendment. Evans v. Newton5 0 extended
this principle to include management by private parties who had replaced
public trustees. As a result, the remaining dispositive question in subse-
quent cases has become whether the state is indeed sufficiently en-
meshed in the operation of a eleemosynary trust to warrant application
of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has developed two methods for determining
whether there exists the requisite "state action" to activate the fourteenth
amendment prohibition against discrimination. The first examines the
actions of the judiciary in enforcing a discriminatory trust to determine
whether the court's activities amount to judicial state action. The second
method requires an evaluation and weighing of the unobvious manifes-
tations of state participation in the operation of a discriminatory trust to
determine whether the state is involved to a "significant" extent.
Judicial state action, as articulated in Shelley v. Kraemer,51 stands
for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment governs the judiciary
just as it controls the actions of the other branches of state government.52
A court order, then, by itself and irrespective of the private nature of the
activity before the bench, is enough to entangle the state in prohibited
49 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
50 382 U.S. 296 (1966); accord, Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
51 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52 [T]he action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be re-
garded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Id. at 14.
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discrimination.53 Thus, in Shelley, the Missouri state courts were pro-
hibited from enforcing a restrictive covenant by which private real
property owners had agreed not to sell or rent certain property to non-
whites. In Barrows v. Jackson54 the Supreme Court expanded Shelley to
preclude damage awards from one covenantor to another, upon breach
of the promise to exclude racial minorities. Shelley and Barrows clearly
cut a broad swath for state action and have been relied upon in some of
the more recent discriminatory trust cases.
55
The significance test, as explained in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Garage,5 6 can be seen as qualifying Shelley. The plaintiff in Burton, a
black man, was refused service in a restaurant located in a parking lot
building managed by a state agency. The restaurant space was leased
from the agency. Upon the facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the
basis for a fourteenth amendment violation had been established, adopt-
ing as its test for state action:
[T]hat private conduct abridging individual rights does no vio-
lence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant
extent the state, in any of its manifestations has been found to
have become involved in it.
57
As judicial action is one of the state's "manifestations," it would seem
that it too may be subjected to the significance test. The Court, however,
has not yet directly made this observation. 58
"Significance" is not a self-defining term. As explained in Burton,
"[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true sig-
nificance. '59 Some limitations on the potential reach of state action
were indicated in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,60 which rejected a claim
that discrimination by a private club was unconstitutional because the
club held a state liquor license. The black plaintiff, who had entered the
club as a guest of a white member, had been denied dining room and bar
service. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, acknowledged the thrust of
Shelley, but nontheless refused to hold,
53 [Jludicial action is not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment simply because it is taken pursuant to the state's common-law policy. Nor
is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimi-
nation, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a pri-
vate agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms. And
when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitu-
tional commands.
Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted).
54 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
55 See notes 160-203 infra and accompanying text.
56 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
51 Id. at 722.
5 See generally Nelkin, Cy Pres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discriminating
Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEO. L.J. 272 (1967).
, 365 U.S. at 722.
60 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives
any sort of benefit or service at all from the state, or if it is sub-
ject to state regulation in any degree whatever."'
The Court also distinguished Burton on the facts.
With the above cases describing some rough boundaries for state
action, certain general questions emerge that transcend any individual
charitable trust with discriminatory provisions. First, do the exemptions
and support and enforcement mechanisms provided for charitable trusts
constitute, per se, a significant state involvement? No court has yet
reached this conclusion. Second, does the judicial state action doctrine
espoused in Shelley prohibit a court from ordering enforcement of an
exclusionary feature in a benevolent trust? Delaware has consistently
answered this affirmatively and there have been positive hints in other
states.62 In contrast, the courts in other jurisdictions have generally
examined the governing instrument and the actual operation of the trust
in each case to determine if significant state action is present. Invariably,
sufficient governmental involvement has been found to make the dis-
criminatory trusts unenforceable, although the significance test has
seldom received explicit application.
V. REMOVAL OF DISCIMINATORY PROVISIONS
The application of equal protection presumes that the activities in
question would be constitutionally permissible if the state were not a
participant and would theoretically allow the continuance of a dis-
criminatory trust once government had terminated its involvement. In
some circumstances, the trust activity can never be carried on wholly in
the private sector, as when state and federal civil rights laws might forbid
any hospital, whether public or private, from rendering services on a
discriminatory basis. In other situations, though, it might be possible to
find a violation of the fourteenth amendment yet permit the trust to pass
to a private rather than a public charitable trustee'in order to avoid state
involvement in the trust's administration and to permit the trust to dis-
criminate. No recent case has reached this result. Judicial treatment of
this situation, as in Evans v. Newton,63 has relied on two themes. First,
a trust that has received nurture from the state may have become ir-
revocably public. In addition, private parties performing essentially gov-
ernmental roles must also share the governmental commitment to racial
and religious equality regardless of the private ownership of the trust
property. Second, state courts have ordinarily found that state participa-
tion in accomplishing trust purposes is more important to a testator than
the requirements for exclusion in the trust and will therefore jettison the
latter element when the two cannot legally co-exist.
In Evans v. Newton, the testator, United States Senator Augustus 0.
6' Id. at 173.
62 See notes 160-203 infra and accompanying text.
63 382 U.S. 296 (1957).
1976]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Bacon, devised a parcel of land to the city officers of Macon, Georgia, to
be used as a park for white persons. The park was controlled by an all-
white Board of Managers and blacks were refused access to the park for
a number of years. When the city took the position that it could no longer
lawfully enforce segregation in a public facility, the Board of Managers
initiated suit, asking that the city be replaced by private trustees to whom
title in the park would be transferred. Black intervenors from Macon
opposed the change. Nonetheless, after the city resigned, private trustees
were appointed by the court. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed their
appointment on appeal by the black intervenors. 64 In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court, Justice Douglas writing the opinion,
followed two themes. First, governmental involvement in the operation of
a charitable trust can affix a public identity to the trust property and sub-
sequent severance of state participation will not necessarily leave a con-
stitutionally neutral trust. "The momentum it acquired as a public facility
is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private'
trustees."65 Second, trust property which is "municipal in nature" should
be treated as a public institution, "regardless of who now has title under
state law."66 Drawing an analogy to fire and police protection, public
streets, the elective process, and mass transit, the Court indicated that
certain matters were simply too public for restricted management by
private parties.
The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. Brown,67 relied on the first of
the Newton themes to find continuing state involvement in the Girard
College trust. In 1957, the United States Supreme Court had ordered
the termination of all state involvement in the administration of the
trust.68 Private trustees were then appointed by the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia County and the college was allowed to continue its segre-
gated operation, an action affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania.69 A decade later, in Pennsylvania v. Brown, the school's con-
tinuing policy of segregation was challenged as being in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. The court found the requisite state action to sup-
port the challenge, even though the college's trust was no longer ad-
ministered by the state. Unable to point to the inherent municipal
nature of schools and colleges, the Brown court could not rely on the
second of the Newton rationales. The court found, however, that a
4 Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
65 382 U.S. at 301.
66 Id. at 302.
67 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
61 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
6 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
570 (1958).
70 [I]n . . . the conception, creation and functioning of Girard College, the close,
indispensable relationship between the College, the City of Philadelphia and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania intended by Mr. Girard, meticulously set out in
his will and faithfully followed for one hundred and twenty-seven years is self-
evident.
392 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
[Vol. 25:1
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss1/4
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
century-old history of public management of the institution had created a
momentum that had not been checked.70
A different situation arises when a testamentary charitable trust is
brought before a probate court for its initial construction. Courts called
upon to rule on testamentary trusts at their inception have no opportunity
to consider any past state participation in the trust property. The two-
pronged Newton rationale, requiring elimination of exclusionary lan-
guage rather than substitution of a private trustee, would not auto-
matically be controlling on the facts. Nevertheless, Newton has been
cited without elaboration in a case involving the initial construction of a
testamentary trust providing white-only scholarships at a state univer-
sity.7
1
In cases where the judicial state action of Shelley v. Kraemer is fol-
lowed, it would seem that the courts could not allow themselves to ap-
point private trustees to enforce a charitable trust on a discriminatory
basis. In Delaware, where the judicial state action concept is adhered to,
this has been implicit in recent cases. That state's courts have declared
themselves unable to issue a discriminatory enforcement order and have
turned to cy pres and deviation to determine what orders they would is-
sue. 2 Generally, however, the issue of substituting private trustees or
otherwise exercising state action has not been raised. Instead, the courts
have simply deleted discriminatory trust directions and proceeded to
apply the trust-saving mechanisms.
VI. TRUSTS EXCLUSIVELY FOR MINoRrrY GRoUP MEMBERS
During the post-Civil War period, the courts were confronted by a
number of testamentary trusts that had been elicited as a result of the na-
tional focus on slavery and the plight of blacks. Perhaps the epitome of
these was the trust in Jackson v. Phillips,73 executed before emancipa-
tion with the purpose of creating a treasury with which abolitionists
such as Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison (named as trustees)
could finance a public opinion attack upon slavery. Another fund was
created for the benefit of runaway slaves. Since the Civil War and the
thirteenth amendment had already ended the institution of slavery, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts utilized cy pres to divert the
trust property to another organization, again to aid directly only black
people. An excerpt from that court's opinion, couched in the stylistic
zeal of another era, insisted that a "perpetual obligation" existed to
"strengthen and confirm the sentiment" that halted the subjugation
"' Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1972). This
seems consonant with the spirit of Newton, but the matter is definitely arguable. Con-
sider this language from Newton:
We only hold that where the tradition of municipal control had become firmly
established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution of trustees
instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.
382 U.S. at 301.
"' See, e.g., Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973); see generally
notes 160-203 infra and accompanying text.
13 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
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of a racial group within our society.7 4 If there is such an obligation, then
justification is present for holding today that equal protection does not
merely require equal treatment. Whenever the vestiges of slavery still
remain - whenever blacks as a group are in a subservient position
reminiscent of slavery - equal treatment would only solidify inequality,
thus arguably failing to meet the "perpetual obligation" Jackson de-
clared.
In 1974, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to resolve this
issue in De Funis v. Odegaard.75 De Funis was a rejected white applicant
to the University of Washington Law School who challenged admission
policies that gave preference to minority group members whose cre-
dentials did not meet entrance criteria as well as did those of some white
applicants, including De Funis. His equal protection challenge was re-
jected by the Supreme Court of Washington 76 in favor of what that court
believed to be a greater state interest in overcoming the history of op-
pression that had been suffered by now-favored minority groups (in-
cluding Indians, Chicanos, and Filipinos as well as blacks7 7 ). The case
attracted some of the nation's keenest legal talent on behalf of both
sides, producing numerous amicus briefs, but the Supreme Court, none-
theless, elected to sidestep a constitutional interpretation and declared
the case moot,78 leaving intact the decision of the state court.
There have been few analogous cases in the trust law field which may
be attributable to the insignificant amount of monies earmarked for ex-
clusively minority charity.7 9  In Fox Estate,0 the testator chose a
Pennsylvania trust company as trustee of a fund for the benefit of a
South Carolina school that was attended only by black students. The
trust instrument directed that the fund should continue to attach to the
14 Negro slavery was recognized by our law as an infraction of the rights insepara-
ble from human nature; and tended to promote idleness, selfishness and tyranny in
one part of the community, a destruction of the domestic relations and utter de-
basement in the other part. The sentiment which would put an end to it is the senti-
ment of justice, humanity and charity, based upon moral duty, inspired by the most
familiar precepts of the Christian religion, and approved by the Constitution of the
Commonwealth. The teaching and diffusion of such a sentiment are not of tem-
porary benefit or necessity, but of perpetual obligation. Slavery may be abol-
ished; but to strengthen and confirm the sentiment which opposed it will continue
to be useful and desirable so long as selfishness, cruelty, the lust of dominion,
and indifference to the rights of the weak, the poor and the ignorant, have a place
in the hearts of men.
Id. at 595.
75 414 U.S. 1038 (1974).
76 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
77 The matter becomes complicated when other minority groups enter the equation.
The fourteenth amendment was aimed at rectifying the subjugation of black people;
other groups endeavoring to establish a right to preferential treatment cannot directly rely
on the same legislative history. See also Edgeter v. Kemper, 136 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio P. Ct.
1955).
78 De Funis had entered the law school by virtue of a lower state court order and was
scheduled to graduate shortly after the Supreme Court's ruling.
'9 But see In re Robbin's Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 718, 371 P.2d 573, 21 Cal. Rptr. 797
(1962), involving a substantial trust fund solely for black children. No fourteenth amend-
ment issue was joined.
10 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 425 (Orphans' Ct. 1959).
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school should its management be assumed by local government, but only
so long as the student body was exclusively black. Otherwise, a gift-over
was required. When the school's operation was later assumed by county
authorities, the accountant for the trust, believing that Supreme Court
decisions had made further funding of a segregated public school unlaw-
ful, submitted the trust's accounts for audit and suggested that the trust
fund henceforth be distributed under the terms of the gift-over. The
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County agreed that the trust could not
be allowed to help finance an all-black public school and ordered ac-
cordingly. The court explained that it deemed itself controlled by Brown
v. Board of Education8' and Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 2 and
said, in reference to the latter case:
It is just as improper for a municipality in a representative ca-
pacity to operate educational facilities solely for the benefit of
Negro students, thereby excluding white children, as it was in the
Girard College case for the City of Philadelphia, acting through
the Board of Directors of City Trusts, to operate Girard College
exclusively for white orphans, thereby excluding the Negro ap-
plicants."3
The reasoning of Fox Estate would furnish a resolution to the issues
in De Funis, for it basically sounds a "sauce for the gander" theme that
demands equivalency of treatment, regardless of the context. Applied
across the board, this would create discomfort for the many affirmative
action programs that have been instituted to increase minority employ-
ment8 4 and would call into question the public housing cases that have
required large-scale dwelling construction in white-occupied neighbor-
hoods.8 5 It could be argued, however, that these actions create no four-
teenth amendment controversy; rather than preferential handling, they
are simply remedial measures designed to curtail the continuing effects
of past discrimination. Essentially, this is a theory of restitution that
attempts to make whole those persons previously denied certain societal
benefits by offering them first choice until an equivalency is achieved.
The Supreme Court accepted this theory in the employment context in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 86 There, black employees of the defendant
utility challenged the use of written tests and educational background
81 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is ironic that the Fox court relied on Brown, in that if the latter
case had been implemented in good faith there would not have been an all-black public
school in South Carolina for the Fox trust fund to support.
825353 U.S. 230 (1957).
83 16 Pa. D. & C.2d at 430.
'4 See, e.g., "Philadelphia Plan," 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACrICES GUIDE 7708
(1975), upheld in Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
15 See, e.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Both cases essentially required affir-
mative action in housing and accordingly ordered housing site selection to proceed on a
"color-conscious" basis until public housing had been dispersed beyond certain core-city
neighborhoods.
86 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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as promotion criteria, asserting that such use violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.87 The employees conceded that the company had halted a
prior policy of restricting blacks to low-level jobs and the lower courts
found that the promotion criteria were neutrally applied. Still, the blacks
argued, the defendant's white employees had never been required to meet
these criteria because they had initially been hired into the better depart-
ments. The black plaintiffs, on the other hand, had to prove themselves
solely because earlier discrimination had confined them to the bottom of
the job hierarchy. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and en-
joined the application of the promotion criteria to those blacks hired
before the criteria were instituted - in substance, ordering special treat-
ment that white employees would not receive.8 8 The Supreme Court
affirmed in an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger said: "[P]ractices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices."89
An important distinction between Griggs and Fox Estate is that the
parties in Griggs were identifiable, their interrelationship was direct
and traceable, and the Court was able to grant relief with an order aimed
at the party responsible for the wrong. In the charitable trust situation
represented by Fox Estate, the parties blur into social abstractions; all
black persons would qualify for the special treatment described in the
trust instrument and all nonblacks would face exclusion. Blame and
compensatory privilege are thus assigned in accordance with broad
social and historical generalizations rather than because of the conduct
of the particular parties before the bench or their identifiable predeces-
sors.
90
What then of the "perpetual obligation" of Jackson v. Phillips to
eradicate the remnants of slavery? When the Supreme Court upset
private housing discrimination in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,91 it
referred to the power of Congress under the thirteenth amendment to
put an end to the "badges and incidents of slavery" by appropriate legis-
lation. For the judiciary to assume such power, and use it to authorize
charitable trusts exclusively for minority benefit, is another matter. The
time may be approaching, however, when a response will have to be
formulated for the questions left unanswered in De Funis. As greater
wealth comes into the hands of minority persons, and as population trends
place urban governmental machinery under minority control, the chari-
table trust designed solely for nonwhites, and involving state action, may
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-2 (1970).
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
19 401 U.S. at 430.
90 Still, the Supreme Court did not balk at tying together broad causes and effects in
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), where even an impartial administra-
tion of a voters' literacy test was struck down because the county's prior dual school
system had left black voters inadequately prepared to pass the test. According to Justice
Harlan for the Court, the use of the test would perpetuate the effects of earlier de jure segre-
gation, with the result that blacks would be denied the right to vote.
91 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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be expected to appear more frequently than such trusts have appeared
to date.
VII. RELIGious DISCRIUINATION
Having examined the charitable trust and its own potential for deal-
ing with racial discrimination, and having considered the impact of the
fourteenth amendment on these trusts, we are returned to the original
question: Can a testator expect exclusionary provisions in a charitable
trust to be allowed to operate? The answer with regard to racial exclusion
is unmistakably no. The religious context is not as clear. It is immediately
distinguishable from the racial context because of the existence of
specific constitutional protection for religious activity in the first amend-
ment. Religion is accorded a special status in the sense that it is intended
to be exclusively and perpetually private. Absent a compelling state
interest in advancing some secular goal, the free exercise clause 2 re-
quires that private religious practitioners be left alone by government.
9 3
The establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits both religious
intrusion into state functioning9 4 and governmental participation in, or
support of, the private religious "monopoly," though it is not an absolute
bar to public aid for religious persons and entities.95
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,96 the United States Supreme Court promul-
gated a three-part test, gleaned from prior decisions, to detect whether
governmental action had violated the establishment clause. The test re-
quired that a statute have a secular purpose, that its primary effect
neither advance nor inhibit religion, and that it not foster an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. Local charitable trust laws
would seem to fail the first two sections of the test in that they grant
benefits to religion qua religion. As we have seen, the earliest trusts
were created on behalf of religious beneficiaries and the advancement
of religion has always been considered a proper charitable purpose.
97
Excessive entanglement, the third element in the Lemon test, is a dif-
ferent matter. As a policy question, in view of the controversy surround-
ing the parochial school funding cases which involved public funds, it
is unlikely that the courts will use the establishment clause to impede
donations of private wealth to religious charities. Charitable donors and
donees could also raise a free exercise argument, drawing upon the doc-
trinal import of the tithe, although their loss of the particular advantages
of the charitable trust would not foreclose other forms of contribution.
Thus far, when religious charitable trusts have been attacked, the
92 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'4 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
" See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (sustaining tax exemptions for reli-
gious properties used solely for religious worship).
96 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon was one of three cases decided together that con-
cerned various forms of state aid to nonpublic schools.
"I One commentator has indicated that religious gift-giving was intended by the fram-
ers of the first amendment to be left undisturbed. See Clark, supra note 36, at 1011-12
& n.124; Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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assault has been lodged not on first amendment grounds, but on the
basis of the fourteenth amendment. One key distinction is at least
implicit in the few cases available. Trusts directly in support of religion,
such as a fund to maintain a parish church, are unanimously accepted
as charitable 8 and apparently immune from constitutional attack. On
the other hand, when religious restrictions are affixed to a trust providing
a service or benefit ordinarily available to the general public, the four-
teenth amendment may be offended. The distinction between the two
situations is that the first example, a trust for the direct use of a re-
ligious recipient for internal maintenance or propagation of the faith,
has not been found to involve a legally significant quantum of state ac-
tion.99 In contrast, a trust to establish a scholarship fund for Jewish
students at a public university, for example, would make the state a
partner in the distribution of benefits to religious adherents generally,
and Jewish people in particular, when equal protection inhibits the state
from dealing with its citizens on the basis of their religious classification.
This conclusion is necessitated by an amalgam of sources, including the
few religious trust cases,100 the rationale of the race discrimination de-
cisions, the first amendment and related holdings,' 0' and the federal
civil rights acts. 102 Nonetheless, case law precisely on point remains
scarce.
The California appellate courts, however, have had two opportunities
to deal with religious exclusion in testamentary dispositions. The testa-
trix in In re Estate of Zahn directed that her residence be willed to the
Salvation Army for a "Music Home for Deserving Christian Students,"
and expressed a desire that another parcel of property in her estate be-
come the site of a rest home for "Christian women and girls who have
no relatives, no smokers or drinkers only deserving citizens who are Na-
9 See cases compiled in A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 371.1, at 2879 n.1.
" In theory, the judicial state action doctrine could prevent a court from issuing an
order awarding trust property to a sectarian donee, even in the absence of other state in-
volvement. But the courts that have subscribed to judicial state action in race discrimina-
tion cases have not extrapolated it to the religious context.
100 Religious sects are entitled to establish and maintain their own parochial educational
systems, for instance, even though religious segregation in a public school is prohibited.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Zahn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 106, 116, 93 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 938 (1971).
In Peoples-Merchant Trust Co. v. Schneider, 4 Ohio App. 2d 52, 411 N.E.2d 93 (1964),
the testator had nominated a bank as trustee to administer a scholarship trust on behalf of
male Catholic graduates of a named high school who would attend Notre Dame University.
The trust was denied an exemption from succession taxes on the grounds that the com-
bined religious and sexual limitations imposed upon acceptable beneficiaries made the trust
disposition not "for the purposes only of public charity." Under Ohio law, it appears that
had the trustee been "an established religious organization," the trust would have quali-
fied for exemption.
10' See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) ("fundamentalist sectarian con-
viction" could not exclude the teaching of competing doctrines in public schools); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (military draft laws were obligated to respect all
religions and parallel beliefs).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1970). See also Daggett v. Children's Center, 28 Conn.
Supp. 468, 266 A.2d 72 (Super. Ct. 1970), where a state executive order resulted in the
deletion of a religious restriction in a charitable trust.
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tive Californians."'1 3 No donee was named in connection with the latter
property (although the Salvation Army was mentioned as an appropriate
party to select occupants of the proposed rest home) and the decedent's
will never specifically spoke of a trust. Nevertheless, the trial court, in a
will contest initiated by cousins of the testatrix, impressed a charitable
trust upon both parcels and awarded them to the Salvation Army. On
appeal, the will challengers raised a fourteenth amendment claim for the
first time. Evading a constitutional ruling, the court explained that the
decedent's designation of Christian beneficiaries was not intended to be
absolute, nor had it been demonstrated that the Salvation Army would
permit only Christians to enjoy the devised property. Zahn concluded
its discussion of equal protection with the cryptic comment that an
organization "devoted to nonsectarian religious purposes is entitled to
receive and administer trust funds on a charitable bequest consistent
with its established aims."10 4 If this may be interpreted to mean that
such an organization could exclude nonreligious persons from enjoying
the benefits of the trust, if those benefits were otherwise made publicly
available, then Zahn is clearly in error.
Both racial and religious discrimination were included in the testator's
will in In re Estate of Vanderhoofven, which arose within a different
district of the California Court of Appeals than Zahn, and which made
no reference to the latter case. The Vanderhoofven will left one dollar
to each of the testator's brothers and sisters and donated the remainder
of his estate "to some Protestant school that is all white of Engineering
training."'10 5 This distribution was contested by the decedent's sib-
lings and other claimants, who successfully charged that the dispositive
scheme ran counter to the fourteenth amendment and were awarded the
decedent's estate in equal shares in accordance with a stipulation offered
by them to the trial court. The state attorney general prosecuted an
appeal on the sole issue of whether cy pres should have been employed
to save the trust for charitable purposes.
The Vanderhoofven opinion obscured as many issues as it resolved,
for it leaped ahead to consider cy pres without initially articulating why
the trust "[could not] be enforced as written (whether through illegality,
impossibility or impracticability). " 106 The probate court had made a
definitive ruling in this regard, holding that the racial designation made
the bequest illegal. This portion of the lower court's ruling was left un-
disturbed by the appeals court, but the appellate opinion left the cause
of illegality in doubt by implying that no state action was present. As for
the religious restrictions, the reviewing court declared that they would not
bring about a disqualification of the trust on constitutional grounds. 0 7
101 16 Cal. App. 3d 106, 110, 93 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
104 Id. at 116, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
1"0 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 943, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261 (1971).
106 Id. at 946, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
101 [W]e do not think the specification of a "protestant" school as the place at which
the engineering training was to be given is significant. It would not be so re-
garded if a specific school, whether of sectarian or nonsectarian origin, had been
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The case was remanded with instructions to reconsider the applicability
of cy pres after gathering additional evidence.
Taken together, Vanderhoofven and Zahn appear to say that a gift to
a sectarian or generally religious donee, even if intended to fund an
activity suffused with state action, will not offend the fourteenth amend-
ment unless it becomes clear that members of the public have been, or
will be precluded from taking advantage of the trust property. In other
words, a religious entity may become a charitable trustee of a trust for
purposes that are not directly religious or doctrinal in the same manner
as any other body. No ripe constitutional issue will surface unless that
trustee practices (or is likely to practice) religious discrimination while
administering the trust. The will in Vanderhoofven did not require the
recipient school to turn away non-Protestants, nor had it occurred that
a discriminating Protestant engineering school had actually been made
trustee. Zahn accepted the Salvation Army as trustee on the same,
albeit somewhat tenuous, assumptions. Both decisions may fairly be said
to imply that future events could justify a reexamination of their re-
spective trusts. 08
If the above cases had been decided differently, the right of religious
bodies to accept charitable trusteeships could have been jeopardized.
As they stand, Zahn and Vanderhoofven take away nothing from the
earlier conclusion that religious restrictions in a charitable trust will not
survive if the trust activity involves significant state action.
VIII. CY PRES AND DEVIATION: A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION
OF TRUST LAW
Once it has become inescapable that a charitable trust will not be
able to operate in accordance with the settlor's primary instructions,
assuming that the cause of failure is not the destruction of the trust
property, what will happen to that property? There are a number of pos-
sibilities. The property may be retained for benevolent use through ap-
plication of either deviation or cy pres; a gift-over can pass the property
to an alternative use designated by the settlor; the property may also re-
vert via a resulting trust to the settlor's estate'09 where it would come to
rest in the testator's residuary estate or pass by intestacy to the settlor's
heirs at law. The exact result in any given case will depend upon the
presence or absence of several factual variables and upon the priorities
assigned to competing policies in the jurisdiction involved. Those poli-
named, and we can see no Fourteenth Amendment or other problem involved
merely because a sectarian designation is general rather than specific.
Id. at 944, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (citation omitted).
L01 Several parties would potentially have standing to initiate a subsequent suit. A
rejected applicant or the state attorney general readily come to mind. A persistent heir or
gift-over donee would also be a likely plaintiff.
101 An exception to enforcing a resulting trust on behalf of the settlor occurs when the
trust purpose has been found illegal. Stone v. Lobsien, 112 Cal. App. 2d 750, 247 P.2d 357
(1952); Caines v. Sawyer, 248 Mass. 368, 143 N.E. 326 (1924). Arguably, a trust that
would foster violation of a civil rights law or constitutional provision would lead to the same
result. In such case, the trustee would retain the trust property, unburdened by the illegal
features. See note 41, supra.
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cies are in turn traceable to fundamental notions about the nature of
property.
The ascendant policy looks to preserve property for community pur-
poses so that once an initial philanthropic intent has been demonstrated
by a donor, only the most unmistakable language in a dispositive instru-
ment will permit withdrawal of that property from public use. The policy
that purports to safeguard the notion of private ownership finds its ex-
pression in an often careful search for donative intent before a failing
charitable trust is rehabilitated or allowed to collapse. The latter notion
appears to be on a decline, though receiving an undiminished supply of
lip-service. Historically, the gift would fail if the donor's intent could
not be completely fulfilled.
Until 1900 the common law emphasis on individual rights and
private property led to a judicial reluctance to deviate from the
original plans of the donor. Where the choice was between a
variance and failure of the gift the latter alternative was adopted.
The wishes of the donor were superior to the necessities of
changing conditions and the interests of society as a whole. 10
That this once-established policy has metamorphosed into an anachro-
nism today means that philanthropists and their counsel will need to
precisely draft their trust instruments if they desire the final say in
property disposition.
A. Cy Pres
Cy pres has been the pivotal concept in the changing picture of chari-
table trust preservation. Once suspected of being a likely tool for despots
and unacceptable in some American states, it is now just one mechanism
by which a court can implement a preference for salvaging charitable
trusts. The earlier suspicion had its origin in the blurring of two distinct
powers, one judicial, and the other monarchical, that existed at common
law. The monarchical power, or prerogative cy pres, was reserved by
the English Crown, as parens patriae, to direct trust property toward
whatever charitable purpose it might choose. The power would be
activated when a donor had selected a use that was charitable in general
nature but nonetheless illegal. Some of the notable abuses of preroga-
tive cy pres seem offensive more because they reflect the religious in-
tolerance of earlier English society than because of the inherent nature
of prerogative cy pres. Still, it is true that the King could wield preroga-
tive cy pres arbitrarily, with no duty to seek out a charitable purpose
consonant with the donor's original intent.
The Crown would also employ prerogative cy pres when a donor had
made a gift to charity generally, without nominating a specific purpose
110 Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1959), citing White v.
Fisk, 22 Conn. 30 (1852); Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Me. 133, 29 A. 949 (1893); Harvard Col-
lege v. Society for Promoting Theological Educ., 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 280 (1855).
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or use and without evincing any desire for a trust arrangement."' Since
the decedent had offered no instructions of his own, the exercise of the
prerogative power in these cases did not frustrate testamentary intent,
but an apprehension about unfettered executive discretion in the distri-
bution of property precluded importation of this use of prerogative cy
pres to the United States. 112  Today a blank gift "to charity" would
generally be preserved for public use by the judiciary, which would
impress the property with a trust and appoint a trustee who in turn would
select a beneficiary, subject to court approval."13
The preference for judicial property distribution was made clear in
the early American cases that accepted judicial cy pres while rejecting
its prerogative counterpart. 1 4  Judicial cy pres is regarded in some
states as but one example of the equitable authority of the courts,"15
while other jurisdictions have believed it necessary to empower their
judges to use cy pres by statute." 6 Even judicial cy pres was formerly
rejected in a number of states," 7 either through a confusion with pre-
rogative cy pres or because, standing on its own right, this doctrine was
viewed suspiciously as imperiling the sanctity of private dispositive
power. A few states still have not formally adopted cy pres but appear
to resort to parallel doctrines, such as "approximation" or "liberal con-
struction," to reach similar results.1 8
Contemporary cy pres, then, is a somewhat amorphous doctrine, vary-
"' See cases collected in A. ScoTr, supra note 6 § 399.1, at 3089 n.1. In DeCosta v.
De Pas, 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (1754), a sum of money had been left in a testamentary trust with
directions that the income be put toward the establishment of a jesuba, or assembly for
reading Jewish law. The chancellor refused to enforce the trust because it promoted a creed
other than that of the officially recognized Church of England. The matter was referred
to the King, who ordered the trust res be used to support a Christian preacher at a
foundling hospital. See also Cary v. Abbot, 32 Eng. Rep. 198 (1802).
112 It [prerogative cy pres] has never, so far as we know, been introduced into the
practice of any court in this country; and if it exists anywhere here, it is in the legis-
lature of the Commonwealth as succeeding to the powers of the king as parens
patriae.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 576 (1867).
113 See In re Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150 (1938) ("[c]harities have always
been favorites of our law, . . . and gifts for such objects have been repeatedly sustained
over the objections that they were too uncertain"). Id. at 429, 197 A. at 150. See also In re
Estate of Quinn, 156 Cal. App. 2d 684, 320 P.2d 219 (1958); Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa
434, 121 N.W. 34 (1909). Contra, Wentura v. Kinnerk, 319 Mo. 1068, 5 S.W.2d 66 (1928).
Some large cities have founded community trusts to receive and administer, inter alia,
undifferentiated charitable donations. A board of trustees, ostensibly representative of the
public-at-large, manages the trust fund for the benefit of the community. See G. Bo-
cEFT, supra note 23, § 330, at 735.
114 See, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
115 In Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 531, 133 A.2d 792 (1957), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute that it believed would compromise judi-
cial hegemony over the cy pres power. See generally G. BOCERT, supra note 23, § 433, at
406.
116 See G. BOCERT, supra note 23, § 433, at 407 n.61; A. ScoTt, supra note 6, § 399,
at 3084 n.2.
"I See G. BOCERT, supra note 23, § 433, at 411-12 nn.65-73; A. ScoTr, supra note 6, §
399.2, at 3094 n.2.
I's Apparently, Arizona, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See, e.g., Mars v. Gilbert, 93
S.C. 455, 77 S.E. 131 (1913); Bell v. Shannon, 212 Tenn. 28, 367 S.W.2d 761 (1963); Hardin
v. Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 51 Tenn. App. 586, 370 S.W.2d 844 (1963).
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ing from one jurisdiction to the next in its source, applicability, and
vitality. There has been little impetus for standardization,"l9 although
the rule in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 20 has been frequently
cited in recent decisions. 12 1 The dissimilarities that exist, however, tend
to arise, in discriminatory trust cases, from different treatment of two
elements of cy pres: the extent and cause of trust failure and the existence
of a general charitable intent.
In the matter of trust failure, an initial decision that a trust has not
fully failed obviates the need to apply cy pres. Such a decision, how-
ever, can be deceiving because it implies that the trust is continuing in
accordance with the testator's directions. Especially in jurisdictions that
have been reluctant to embrace cy pres, a court may prefer to leave that
doctrine rest, even though it appears indisputable that the trust has failed.
In Zevely v. City of Paris,12 2 the settlor created a trust fund to provide
cost-free medical care for "deserving young" male occupants of a desig-
nated hospital room. A reversion to the settlor's estate was to occur
should the hospital close, but when the hospital was sold some years
later, the court diverted the trust income to the construction of a nursing
home at another site. The court stated that the trust purpose was still
being accomplished by the diversion of funds.
Whereas Zevely illustrated judicial manipulation of the extent of
trust failure, Howard Savings Institution v. Peep,'23 considered the cause
of failure, particularly the possibility of a recipient institution ridding
itself of trust restrictions it does not favor by inviting failure. In Howard,
'19 The rule contained in the Model Act Concerning the Administration of Charitable
Trusts, Devises and Bequests, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, provides that:
If a trust for charity is or becomes illegal, or impossible or impracticable of fulfill-
ment or if a devise or bequest for charity, at the time it was intended to become
effective is illegal, or impossible or impracticable of fulfillment, and if the settlor,
or testator, manifested a general intention to devote the property to charity, a court
of equity may, on application of any trustee, or any interested party or the attorney
general of the state, order an administration of the trust, devise or bequest as near-
ly as possible to fulfill the general charitable intention of the settlor or testator.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 399 (1959) provides:
If a property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the prop-
erty to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the appli-
cation of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general
charitable intention of the settlor.
121 E.g., Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College, 170 Colo. 327,
461 P.2d 28 (1969); Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969).
122 298 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1957). Zevely contained restrictions based on sex and age.
The efficacy of classifying persons on the basis of these characteristics is now coming under
steady and often intensive scrutiny. Sex discrimination in probate law was successfully
challenged in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute giving preference to males in
appointments as administrators of decedents' estates held to deny equal protection). The
ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment, guaranteeing the voting rights of 18-year-olds,
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, and the increasing protests by the elderly against job discrimina-
tion would suggest that age is no longer a benign category. The states, on the other hand,
may in certain instances be able to demonstrate a countervailing interest sufficient to meet
the test enunciated in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), thereby
legitimizing unequal treatment based on sex or age classifications.
123 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961).
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the testator gave $50,000 to Amherst College to hold in trust as a scholar-
ship fund for "deserving American born, Protestant Gentile boys." The
college's board of trustees concluded that religious limitations were in-
consistent with Amherst's charter and resolved to decline the gift unless
the offending restrictions were eliminated. During the ensuing action for
construction of the will, the executor argued that the college was at-
tempting to "bootstrap" itself - in otherwords, having by its own act
frustrated the donor's intent, it was then asking the court to use that
frustration as a basis for altering the trust terms. The court conceded
that there did exist a "rule" prohibiting trustees from voluntarily pre-
cipitating trust failure, 24 but decided that the rule had not been violated,
explaining that the source of failure, the Amherst charter's anti-exclu-
sionary provisions, was beyond the control of the college. The explana-
tion is not fully persuasive. The Amherst trustees had their choice, and
though one would not have expected them to undertake charter revision
to accommodate a $50,000 gift with religious strings attached, it does
not necessarily follow that failure was therefore the result of external
circumstances, or that the college retained first call upon the trust fund.
If the Howard decision can be interpreted to say that when an organiza-
tion rejects a gift that clashes with its by-laws and policies, it may still
claim the gift after causing removal of the objectionable features, one
might properly ask how it serves a donor to bother drafting trust instruc-
tions. 125
At the same time, the ultimate resolution of Howard does not appear
unwarranted. As frequently occurs, the trustee originally nominated by
the charitable settlor is, under the circumstances, the best party for
carrying out the donative intent. When the trustee insists upon altering
the literal face of the trust instructions, it is arguably making the type of
managerial decision that the settlor expected to be made. 26  Still, it is
settled law that a fiduciary is held by an exacting standard of loyalty to
honor the terms of the trust and its class of beneficiaries.2 7 As the
124 Id. at 510, 170 A.2d at 47, citing Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d
491 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
'21 The settlor's executor had put forth the alternative of appointing a substitute trustee
who would administer the trust on behalf of Amherst students who met the settlor's
qualifications. Though the college had declared it would "avoid any involvement whatso-
ever in the administration of the trust" it had also informed the court that it would not
refuse to make normal academic records available upon a student's direct request. The
executor's plan was dismissed as impractical, though it would have operated no differently
than existing scholarship funds.
One cannot help but surmise that the Howard court would have preferred to dispose
of the case on constitutional grounds, for it noted preliminarily that none of the parties had
raised a fourteenth amendment issue regarding the religious restrictions. The court then
cited two timely law review articles on the topic of discrimination, which the litigants
themselves had no reason to call to the court's attention because the issue was not before
the bench.
2I In Attorney Gen. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 350 Mass. 125, 213
N.E.2d 840 (1966), the University had received land for an arboretum, plus gifts for its
maintenance. Various materials were diverted from support of the arboretum and deposited
elsewhere for study. The transfers were held not to violate the conditions under which
the gifts were made:
In the light of this, in a gift to a university of trust funds to create a specific sub-
division of scientific or cultural activity of the university (that is, broadly, a de-
[%lot. 25:1
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fiduciary of a philanthropic trust seeks to adjust testamentary instruc-
tions in order to better satisfy its own institutional objectives (which is
often necessary when unsophisticated testators have misunderstood the
methods and goals of their donees), the duty of loyalty can lose its pri-
ority. This may be the inevitable price of keeping charitable contribu-
tions fluid and responsive to community needs. It would benefit judi-
cial credibility to acknowledge this as a policy decision rather than, as
in Howard, attempting to characterize a trustee's voluntary refusal to
abide by a testator's wishes as a trust "failure" for reasons beyond the
trustee's control.
Another cause of trust failure is the changing of key circumstances
in the operation of the trust. In determining which circumstances are
germaine to the effective functioning of the trust plan and in deciding
when changes in those circumstances have become sufficiently material
to justify trust revision, the courts have shown considerable resource in
saving trusts from both lethargy and extinction.
Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College'28 in-
volved an application by the trustees of Clayton College, an orphanage
in Colorado, to remove certain restrictions on the admission of children
to the college. In a manner reminiscent of the Girard College will,
George Clayton had limited access to his school to "poor white male
orphans, between the ages of 6 and 10,"'129 whose fathers were deceased.
The trustees convincingly recounted the evolution in child care that had
rendered the founder's instructions obsolete. The school's age require-
ments had settled into diametric opposition to the contemporary pref-
erence for placing younger children in private homes rather than in-
stitutional settings. Welfare services had reduced the importance of
poverty as a sole cause for institutionalization of a child and death of a
male parent (as opposed to desertion, divorce, or incarceration) had be-
come a relatively infrequent cause of deprivation of care. Plainly these
factors, even considered together, had not made the precise terms of the
Clayton trust impossible or even impractical of fulfillment. The court
nonetheless wisely concluded that cy pres should be applied:
partment), there is, we think, an implied intention that the managers of the uni-
versity shall determine in their best judgment what policies, in respect of that
department, within the express trust purposes, will give that department and the
trust assets used therein their greatest usefulness. Certainly it is implied that to
such end the managers may decide to correlate the activities of the department
with the overall policies of related departments, provided all applicable restric-
tions are regarded, and the trust assets are used advantageously for the specific
purposes of the trust.
Id. at 138, 213 N.E.2d at 847-48.
117 The trustees of a charitable trust, like those of a private trust, are under a duty
of loyalty; they must administer the trust solely with a view to the accomplish-
ment of the purposes of the trust and not with a view to promoting their own in-
terests. Self-dealing is clearly improper.
A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 379, at 2979-80.
128 170 Colo. 327, 461 P.2d 28 (1969).
129 Id. at 328, 461 P.2d at 29. The state attorney general, the defendant in Dunbar,
declined to defend the racially discriminatory provision. The lower court's order to strike
the racial references was affirmed.
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It is not necessary that it become finally impossible to further ad-
minister the college in exact compliance with the wishes of the
testator. Where, as here, it is evident to the trial court that the
operation of the trust has failed to fulfill the general charitable
intention of the settlor, and the only possibility is that the situa-
tion will become worse in the future, the court is justified in ap-
plying the doctrine of cy pres on the basis of impracticability.
1 30
Dunbar is essentially a vote against paying unquestioning homage
to testamentary schemes under circumstances where dead hand control
leaves present needs unanswered.1 3 1  Entities, systems, and customs
ordinarily become obsolete long before they disappear altogether. Cling-
ing to a rigid standard of impossibility or impracticability can render
charity less adaptable than changing conditions demand. It may be that
"failure" is a misleading term for the condition that must exist before a
court will consider an application for deviation or cy pres.
The concept of general charitable intent is the other component of
cy pres that has received a variety of treatment from state to state. The
general rule in most jurisdictions is that an overriding general benevo-
lence will be presumed, thus justifying retention of the trust corpus for
some related charitable use, unless the testator has exhibited unalter-
able opposition to all but a pet charity or has provided for a gift-over.
13 2
Disagreement exists as to whether a gift-over should operate automati-
cally or merely be weighed as but one factor negating a general chari-
table intent. A look at the discrimination cases that have contained
gifts-over suggests that, standing alone, such gifts will not necessarily
preclude further inquiry by a court. 3
In Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hospital,
1 3 4
where a testatrix created a trust fund to underwrite the expenses of "Cau-
casian" patients in a designated hospital room, it was provided that the
trust property should become part of the residue of her estate in the
event that the trust terms were held to "violate any law." The residue
was itself dedicated to the use of a number of charitable organizations.
The executor of the will brought an action to obtain a construction of
the trust provisions, particularly the legality of the racial restriction.
Once the court had determined that nonwhites could not properly be
130 Id. at 334, 461 P.2d at 32.
131 But see Estate of McKee, 378 Pa. 607, 108 A.2d 214 (1954), where the court would
not apply cy pres to a plan to establish a naval academy for poor male orphans. Instead, the
trustee was directed to spend five years seeking supplementary financial support for the
proposed scheme.
M32 See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Cyril & Julia C. Johnson Memorial Hosp.,
30 Conn. Supp. 1, 294 A.2d 586 (Super. Ct. 1972); Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165
S.E.2d 160 (1968), aff'd, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d
573 (1964), rev'd, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Board of Trustees of York College v. Cheney, 158
Neb. 292, 63 N.W.2d 177 (1954); In re Syracuse Univ., 3 N.Y.2d 665, 148 N.E.2d 671,
171 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1958). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 401 (1959).
133 Generally, however, the gift-over is controlling. See cases collected in A. ScoTr,
supra note 6, § 399.2, at 3094 n.3 8 4.
134 30 Conn. Supp. 1, 294 A.2d 586 (Super. Ct. 1972).
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denied access to the trust benefits, it framed the issue remaining before
it as follows:
The essential question is whether the testatrix would have pre-
ferred the alternative disposition to the charities listed in the
residuary clause over the establishment of the hospital trust
without the racial limitation. In this case, no other evidence
having been presented, the court is confined to the will in at-
tempting to ascertain her intentions. If the gift-over provision
was meant to be an expression of her preference, it must be re-
spected.135
The court ultimately gave effect to the gift-over, emphasizing that the
alternative beneficiaries were also charitable, thus suggesting that a
gift-over to a private party might elicit a different result.
If a gift-over is no more than evidence of a limited charitable in-
tent, estate planners should wonder how they can draft an instrument
with confidence that their instructions will be followed. 136  The Con-
necticut Bank court acknowledged that it was heavily influenced by the
"violate any law" clause which specifically anticipated the precise rea-
son for trust failure. An attorney could easily predict the likely consti-
tutional causes for failure of an exclusionary trust and link those causes
to the operation of the gift-over. But if the potential causes of trust
failures are spelled out too minutely, a court may hold that only those
causes will activate the gift-over. 137 Finally, the absence of a gift-over
will be taken as positive evidence of a general charitable intent.
38
The necessity of a general intent is being subjected to reevaluation.
In Pennsylvania, a statute permits application of cy pres whether the
donor's intent was "general or specific."' 39  Professor Bogert recom-
mends that other states follow the Pennsylvania example or that they
adopt a presumption that a general charitable intent is extant unless
expressly denied by the settlor. 40 The reply could certainly be made
that this would amount to a serious diminution of the philanthropist's
prerogative, but the effect would be felt more in the realm of theory
than actual practice, for the courts have been notably resourceful in
finding a general intent. If anything, there is often a fictional quality
to the entire process of answering questions about the donor's prefer-
ences when the donor probably never formed any such preferences.1
4
'
135 Id. at 8, 294 A.2d at 581 (emphasis added).
136 See also Trammell v. Elliot, 230 Ga. 841, 848, 199 S.E.2d 194, 199 (1973):
Other evidence supportive of the establishment of a specific and exclusive in-
tention was also absent from the will, for there was no provision in the devise,
for example, for a reverter clause or an alternative gift over in the event of a fail-
ure of the grant.
'37 E.g., Brice v. Trustees of All Saints Memorial Chapel, 31 R. 183, 76 A. 774 (1910).
131 See cases collected in G. BOCERT, supra note 23, § 437, at 426 n.33.
139 20 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6110 (1972).
140 G. BOGERT, supra note 23, § 436, at 424.
141 In some instances, long-dead testators have been vested by the court with exalted
qualities, but alas victimized by the unenlightenment of their times:
Given everything we know of Mr. Girard, it is inconceivable that in this changed
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When the controlling will is silent on trust failure, the claims against
a general intent are not so much spurious as meaningless. Arguing as
adversaries to charity, unsupported by countervailing public policies
(unless the complainants are now helpless dependents of the deceased),
the challengers engage the court in hypothecation in the name of pre-
serving the testator's wishes. Given the guesswork involved and recog-
nizing the predilection for saving property for charity, this use of over-
burdened judicial resources hardly seems worth the effort. It would be
preferable to identify precisely what an estate planner must do to avert
the application of cy pres and retain property for public use if those
steps are not taken.
Only twice in recent years has a general charitable intent been found
absent when trusts have been unenforceable as written on account of racial
or religious discrimination. 4 2 The more questionable decision was ren-
dered in La Fond v. City of Detroit,4 3 which concerned a one-sentence
residuary bequest.'14  When the Detroit Common Council resolved to
accept the bequest (about $25,000) only if the proposed Sagendorph
Field could be available to all children irrespective of color or creed,
litigation subsequently ensued to determine whether the testatrix had pos-
sessed an overriding charitable sentiment and thus would have preferred
an integrated playground over failure of the gift. The lower court char-
acterized the words "for white children" as words of command that pro-
hibited a finding of general intent and held the gift void, thereby per-
mitting it to pass intestacy to the heirs of the testatrix. The Michigan
Supreme Court deadlocked four to four resulting in an affirmation of
the lower court decision. The opinion for the justices opposed to apply-
ing cy pres displayed a conceptual rigidity that has virtually disappeared
from analogous cases:
There is nothing in the will nor in the record disclosing a more
general purpose than the specified purpose - a playfield for
white children - and there is nothing in the will or record which
in the slightest way indicates deceased desired the money to be
applied to any other purpose than a "playfield for white chil-
dren."145
world he would not be quietly happy that his cherished project had raised its
sights with the times and joyfully recognized that all human beings are created
equal.
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1968).
142 Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Cyril & Julia C. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 30 Conn.
Supp. 1, 294 A.2d 586 (Super. Ct. 1972), is omitted here because the gift there was al-
lowed to fail due to a gift-over, also in favor of a charitable beneficiary. Thus, the case
does not appear to represent a situation where general charitable intent was declared
missing.
143 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959).
144 The balance of my estate after deducting the above bequests is to be given to
the city of Detroit, Wayne county, Michigan for a playfield for white children,
and known as the "Sagendorph Field."
Id. at 363, 98 N.W.2d at 530.
141 Id. at 367, 98 N.W.2d at 532-33.
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Presumably, the quoted passage was designed to uphold the inviola-
bility of two legal constructs: the written instrument and the testa-
mentary prerogative. The former objective was likely achieved, although
at the expense of losing the legacy for the community. As for the sec-
ond construct, La Fond adequately demonstrated the disutility of dis-
putes about general charitable intent. The testatrix's relatives, the
champions of her donative rights, argued that she was motivated by
"hatred for children of all races except white,"'14 6 that her "intentions
were more of a striking back at the Negro population than as a charita-
ble effort, '147 and that at the same time she was striving to keep her
property from her legal heirs. The justices for affirmance agreed with
none of this, but still concluded that Mrs. Sagendorph's racial restric-
tions were central to her dispositive scheme. As a result, the legacy
passed to the heirs and the memorial for the deceased's husband, which
all the justices believed the playfield was to be, was never created - a
resolution that hardly graced the testatrix, advantaged the community,
or facilitated the flow of wealth toward eleemosynary use.
This is not to say that in the final analysis the La Fond court was surely
wrong about the testatrix's preferences. Rather, the defect in the deci-
sion is in its process, in its presumption that charitable trusts will fail
when their initial plan is obstructed unless a case can be made out for
preservation. In this respect, La Fond flows against the current of recent
authority that salvages charitable trusts whenever feasible.
The other recent discriminatory trust case in which a general chari-
table intent was found absent was Evans v. Abney, 1 8 another in the
series of actions regarding the will of Senator Augustus Bacon, discussed
earlier. After the attempt to remove state involvement from the man-
agement of the trust property by replacing the municipal authorities
with private trustees was thwarted by the Supreme Court in Evans v.
Newton, 4 9 the successor trustees moved to have the trust declared un-
enforceable, so that the trust property would revert to the testator's
heirs. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision grant-
ing the request, rejecting the contentions of both the state attorney gen-
eral and the black intervenors that cy pres should be employed to sal-
vage the trust. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 50
Unlike La Fond v. Detroit, the trust instrument in Evans presented
the court with a clear insight into the opinions of the testator on the ex-
act issue at bar,'5 ' as well as some unequivocal language about the
propriety of swerving from his trust directions. Purely from the per-
spective of trust law, the Bacon will would seem to have offered suf-
146 Id. at 367, 98 N.W.2d at 532.
147 Id.
"-" 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968), aff'd, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
149 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
150 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
151 224 Ga. 826, 830, 165 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1968):
I am however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social relations the
two races should be forever separate and that they should not have pleasure or
recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common.
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ficient information to justify the conclusion of the Georgia courts, al-
though it was not necessarily the only conclusion impelled by the totality
of the evidence. 152
The constitutional ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision un-
derstandably provoked a wealth of commentary, much of which is be-
yond the scope of this article. What is of importance here is that Evans
v. Abney confirmed the primacy of the state courts in nonconstitutional
trust and probate questions. The applicability of cy pres in any given
case, according to Evans, is a local determination that the Supreme
Court will not disturb - a rule that the high Court indicated it would have
adhered to had Evans been decided differently in Georgia: "Nothing we
have said here prevents a state court from applying its cy pres rule in a
case where the Georgia court, for example, might not apply its rule.' 154
The action, then, regarding cy pres is in the state courts.
B. Deviation
Deviation, 155 also referred to as "approximation" and "modifica-
tion," is a mechanism that has increasingly converged with cy pres,
though its origins and formalities of usage are quite distinguishable,
often in important respects. In contrast to cy pres, with its unfortunate
identification with prerogative cy pres and its checkered pattern of ac-
ceptance, deviation emanates from the general equitable powers pos-
sessed by the courts as they oversee trusts, both charitable and private. 15
Deviation theoretically entails a more limited alteration in the original
trust plan than does cy pres because it countenances changes in the
152 The will had been executed in 1911, and reserved a life estate in the land known
as Baconsfield for the testator's wife and daughters so that title would not pass to the
city until the death of the survivor of them. Allowing the land to be withdrawn from
public use 50 years after it had been acquired by the city (which had purchased the inter-
est of Senator Bacon's surviving daughter in 1920) sets a potentially ruinous precedent
for charitable beneficiaries who might similarly discover that changing social values had
left them in violation of trust terms after years of operation. An analogy to the Rule
Against Perpetuities suggests itself - perhaps a statute permanently retaining property
for charitable purposes after it has been so used for a stated number of years.
1' E.g., Bogen, Evans v. Abney: Reverting to Segregation, 30 MD. L. REV. 226 (1970);
Lathrop, The Fourteenth Amendment's Effect Upon State Laws Governing the Use of
Land: A Comment on Evans v. Abney, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 511 (1972); Note, Reversion of
a Public Park in Lieu of Integration: A Disadvantage of the Freedom of Testation, 24
Sw. L.J. 717 (1970); Comment, Reversion of Racially Discriminatory Trusts, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 54 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law Estates - Reversion of the Res of a Charita-
ble Trust, 2 LOYOLA U. Cni. L.J. 390 (1971); Case Comment, Constitutional Law - State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 NomE DAME LAW. 399 (1971); Recent De-
velopments, Constitutional Law, The Equal Protection Clause as Applied to Reversions
of Charitable Trusts, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 181 (1971).
154 396 U.S. at 447.
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TnusTs § 381 (1959):
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from a
term of the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal,
or that owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by
him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust.
156 See generally A. SCOTT, supra note 6, § 381, at 2983.
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management of the trust rather than in its ultimate purpose. 57 By char-
acterizing an intrusion into a charitable trust as a deviation, rather than
cy pres, a court is thus drawing from a deeper well of legitimacy to ef-
fect, ostensibly, a lesser change in the dispositive instructions.
When employing deviation there is no need to search for a general
charitable intent because no change in specific intent is contemplated,
save for a reworking of administrative details. Nor does the presence of
a reverter or gift-over prevent a court from utilizing deviation, again
because the primary purpose of the trust remains capable of fulfillment
after its method of accomplishment has been altered. For these reasons
it is somewhat regrettable that, from the standpoint of technical preci-
sion, trust deviation and cy pres are often treated identically. 5 8
In the discrimination cases, the proposed change in the trust instru-
ment is usually the deletion of the words of racial or religious classifica-
tion. Obviously, there is a significant difference in holding that "white
only" is an administrative detail instead of a dominant element in the
fabric of a trust. Practically speaking, the ultimate outcome of a given case
may not be affected by the blurring of this difference,159 but it should
be understood that the task of counsel looking to preserve a charitable
trust will be demonstrably easier if the results of cy pres can be achieved
by proving the requirements for deviation.
CONCLUSION
A settlor cannot expect racially discriminatory provisions in a trust to
operate, although provisions which discriminate in favor of a religion
may be sustained under certain circumstances. As to discriminatory
race provisions in a trust, the elimination of such provisions on constitu-
tional grounds, or as a result of the application of the trust law doctrines
of voiding conditions, c!! pres, or deviation may not mean that the trust
will terminate. Instead, the trust may continue without the offensive
provisions if enough of a trust purpose can be salvaged to justify con-
tinuation. There is a great hesitation on the part of courts to terminate
charitable trusts. Nonetheless, there is still the possibility that the elimi-
nation of racial provisions which discriminate may cause the trust to
fail and the trust property to revert to the settlor, to the settlor's heirs,
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRs'Ts, Explanatory Notes § 381, Comment a at 273
(1959):
The rule stated in this Section has to do with the powers and duties of the trustees
of charitable trusts with respect to the administration of the trust; it has to do with
the methods of accomplishing the purposes of the trust. The question of the ex-
tent to which the court will permit or direct the trustee to apply the trust property
to charitable purposes other than the particular charitable purpose designated by
the settlor where it is or becomes impossible or illegal or impracticable to carry
out the particular purpose involves the doctrine of cy pres ....
'm See generally Reed v. Eagleton, 384 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Mo. 1964). Cases which
recognize that finding a general charitable intent is unnecessary are, Essex County Bank
& Trust Co. v. Attorney Gen., 351 Mass. 701, 220 N.E.2d 926 (1966); Craft v. Schroyer,
81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
"' "[T]his is sometimes described as cy pres, sometimes as deviation. But the label is
not important. The power and its application are." Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255
A.2d 710, 716 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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or to pass to the parties designated in the trust as a gift-over. A careful
draftsman can ensure termination of the charitable trust if he is told by
his client that an instrument of trust must contain a racially discrimina-
tory provision but the objective is a gift-over of the trust property to
designated parties if (indeed, when) the discriminatory provision should
fail. Such a client would be best advised to eliminate the racially dis-
criminatory provision, or to plan on the gift-over.
APPENDIX
SURVEY OF RECENT DECISIONS
Thus far, the components of the discriminatory charitable trust and
resultant litigation have each been examined in isolation. In order to
convey a working perspective for the attorney in a particular jurisdic-
tion, there follows a survey of those jurisdictions that have had occasion
to pass judgment on exclusionary philanthropy in recent years. A few
states have confronted the problem more than once and the evolution
and clarification that have occurred within these jurisdictions are as il-
luminating as interstate differences. Some of the following cases have
already been considered in part and those discussions will not be re-
peated in detail.
Delaware. Bank of Delaware v. Buckson'60 concerned a trust created
to provide one college scholarship each year for a white male graduate
between 17 and 21 years of age from any Wilmington high school. The
recipient was to be selected by a three-person committee consisting of
the Chief Justice of the state supreme court, the principal of Wilmington
High School, and the president of the bank serving as the testator's trus-
tee, or their successors in office (or named alternative parties). The
trust began operation in 1933, and the committee was always composed
of the Chief Justice, 16' the principal, and officers of the bank; only the
applications of white students were accepted until the trustee initiated
an action seeking instruction on the validity of the white-only require-
ment.
Buckson discussed whether the makeup of the selection committee
permeated the trust with sufficient state involvement to violate the four-
teenth amendment but never decided the matter. Instead, the court con-
cluded that it was prohibited by the rationale of Shelley v. Kraemer
16 2
from issuing a judicial order that would contravene the Constitution.16 3
160 Id.
161 The presence of the Chief Justice on the committee might have raised some inter-
esting questions had the case been appealed. Additionally, the Chancellor, author of the
Buckson opinion, was a designated alternate for the committee. No chancellor, however,
ever actually served as a member of the committee.
162 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
le These rulings by the highest courts in our Country and State quite clearly limit
this Court in what instructions it may give the Trustee. The short of it is that
the Court may not advise the Trustee to reject applications from non-whites be-
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By focusing on the role of the judiciary rather than the workings of the
trust, Buckson made state action an inevitable consequence of obtaining
judicial assistance in the maintenance of a trust. The logic of this po-
sition, if adhered to, would similarly bind the state courts whether the
trust was charitable or private, whether the testamentary disposition was
by trust, gift or otherwise, and whether the excluded class was measured
by religion, race or any other constitutionally forbidden classification.
At least in the context of racial discrimination, later cases, as will be
seen, show that Delaware has not retreated from the reasoning of Buck-
son.
The court's declaration on judicial state action meant that the trust
could not be enforced as written. To determine what instructions it
would give the trustee, the court looked to see if deviation or cy pres,
which it regarded as fungible concepts, were applicable. Recounting
the changes in the social order that had transpired since the settlor's
death, 64 the court concluded that deviation was warranted. The court
also observed that the testator had exhibited a general charitable intent,
which was technically superfluous to the application of deviation.
Buckson created confusion when it embarked on a discussion of state
action other than judicial. There would seem to be no need to find
both elements once judicial state action had bound the court's hands.
The confusion was not altogether alleviated in subsequent cases.
In In re Will of Potter15 the testator, who had died in 1843, left a
testamentary trust for the benefit of "poor white citizens of Kent Coun-
ty." When the State Department of Public Welfare referred a black
applicant to the trust agent, the latter party petitioned the court for
instructions, in particular to find out whether continued rejection of
black applicants would be unconstitutional.
The Potter court reiterated the Buckson position that the court could
not constitutionally order discrimination, but also took the position that
a solely private trust could constitutionally discriminate. 66 The court
further postulated that the Potter trust itself could have remained pri-
vate if the Chancellor "had become relegated to purely administrative
acts, such as the appointment of successor trustees when required so as
cause such advice would amount to state (judicial) enforced discrimination in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
255 A.2d at 715.
164 Sixty-one percent of the students in Wilmington's high schools were black at the
time of the Buckson litigation, as was the principal of Wilmington High School - a mem-
ber of the selection committee.
'6 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970).
166 See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962),
where black applicants who had been denied admission to Tulane University because of
their race had sought injunctive and declaratory relief that would permit their enrollment.
The school's administrators were willing to admit the black applicants but averred that
they were precluded from doing so by the terms of a trust that had been incorporated into
the University charter. The court concluded that Tulane was a private school with insuf-
ficient state connection to violate the fourteenth amendment. Yet the court also held
that, in view of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953), the court would not be able to enforce the racially exclusionary provisions
in the trust if Tulane officials chose to ignore them. The University subsequently opened
its facilities to black students.
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to ensure continuance of trust purposes and approval of trustee ac-
counts."' 67 (The Chancellor had appointed all trustees and agents since
the inception of the trust, although the trust had directed a different
method of selection.)
Apparently Potter differentiated between the limited judicial role of
which it approved and an outright order enforcing discrimination. This
is not consistent with Shelley v. Kraemer, upon which Potter relied.
Just as Shelley prohibited judicial support of a purely private coven-
ant, it would seem evident that a chancery court could not, to use the
court's words, "ensure continuance of trust purposes" if the trust ex-
cluded non-whites. Nonetheless, the Potter court attempted to set some
limits on the judicial state action doctrine in Delaware and accordingly
laid down a foundation of dictum for future cases.
In Potter itself, the court found sufficient state action, primarily ju-
dicial, to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment. It was
noted that the state legislature had occasionally enacted special statutes
to facilitate trust operation, that the state owned 49 percent of the out-
standing stock in the bank currently serving as trustee, and that state
agencies channelled applicants for trust monies to the trust agent. But
the court especially emphasized the significance of the Chancellor's in-
volvement in supervision of the trust.""
The court then determined that cy pres and deviation (treated fungi-
bly, as in Buckson) would be employed to preserve the trust after the
racial limitations were excised. Potter also discussed changing social
circumstances to provide a perspective on the testator's intent. As the
court seemed to be operating more in terms of cy pres than deviation,
the search for general intent was procedurally sound.
In Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler,169 the Chancellor's concise opinion
proclaimed that "[by] now the law against discrimination is settled be-
yond argument.."' 70  The testator in Milford had established a trust to
provide educational opportunities for "white boys and girls." From
1939, the trust was specifically used to furnish scholarships for gradu-
ates of a public high school.
Milford, which was decided by the author of Buckson, seemed to say
that the latter case, rather than Potter, was the definitive statement in
Delaware on judicial state action. The retrenchment in Potter, permit-
ting some minimum judicial entanglement, did not reappear in Milford.
Instead, the court spoke unequivocally, declaring that a judge "may not
take any judicial action based upon racial discrimination."'' No excep-
167 275 A.2d at 580.
168 [T~he involvement of the Court of Chancery in the supervision and direction
of the administration of the charitable trust set up under the will of Benjamin
Potter is of such an established and pervading nature that such involvement con-
stitutes that type of governmental entwinement with the affairs of a charitable
trust which calls into play the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 583.
109 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973).
170 Id. at 536.
"I' Id. (emphasis added).
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tions were offered. Although Milford allowed that "entirely private"
trusts could constitutionally discriminate, the court defined a private
trust as one "which does not involve, in any way, action by the State
or its agents .... ."172 Milford appeared to say that a racially exclu-
sionary trust would receive no help whatsoever in a Delaware court.
As the court specifically spoke only of racial discrimination, it may be
inferred that the constitutionality of religious or other forms of exclu-
sion were not decided by Milford. Potter, on the other hand, had also
referred to discrimination "for any other unconstitutional or unreason-
able purpose.' 7 3
Milford also formulated a definition of nonjudicial state action that
widened that concept in Delaware. While in Buckson and Potter, state
participation had been contemplated in the trust instrument, there were
no such orders in the Milford trust. The court, however, found that
the history of the trust administration, particularly of the process by
which recipients were selected, showed that the public school system
had maintained an intricate involvement. Thus, "apart from what an
instrument may say, actual State participation is an independent test of
constitutionality."'174 This kind of analysis, peering beyond the trust in-
structions "to the way in which its affairs are actually conducted,'
175
provides a safeguard against cases of willful discrimination where the
settlor hopes to circumvent the law with a seemingly neutral trust in-
strument. With state action making racial exclusion illegal, the court
sought and found a general charitable intent, although it declared that
the trust was being preserved by deviation rather than cy pres.
In sum, the Delaware cases stress two significant notions: that ju-
dicial state action prohibits the courts from furthering impermissible
discrimination, and that even unobtrusive forms of state action in trust
terms or actual management can run afoul of equal protection guarantees.
Connecticut. In Daggett v. Children's Center, 76 a trust fund was es-
tablished for the care of orphans in the New Haven area. The trustees
were to pay the trust income to the managers of a named orphanage,
provided that the managers were all "of the Protestant faith." The
managers were solely Protestant until 1968 when the state governor
issued an executive order forbidding discriminatory practices by state
agencies. The managers of the orphanage then abandoned the religious
restriction so as not to jeopardize its contractual relationship with the
state welfare commissioner. An action was then instituted by the trust-
ees to obtain the court's instructions regarding future payments of the
trust funds.
All of the parties had stipulated that the trustees should continue
to contribute to the orphanage, then known as The Children's Center,
172 Id.
173 275 A.2d at 579.
174 301 A.2d at 537.
175 Id.
176 28 Conn. Supp. 468, 266 A.2d 72 (Super. Ct. 1970).
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and the court agreed, relying on what was termed "approximation"
(functionally, cy pres). To support its finding that the original group of
settlors had borne an overriding charitable intent, the court performed
an historical analysis of the circumstances surrounding the orphanage
since its founding, especially the once-pervasive sectarian influence in
custodial child care. Not only had that influence dwindled, but even the
nature and reliance on custodial care itself had been drastically revised.
Therefore, the court concluded, if the settlors had been interested in
aiding deprived children in the manner such aid was administered in
1864, it was reasonable to assume they would have a similar desire in
1970, regardless of the religious affiliation of the Center's managers.
If philanthropy is to be kept responsive to contemporary public needs,
the Daggett reasoning is sound.
Two years later, Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial
Hospital,177 arose in the form of a will construction, and there, as dis-
cussed earlier, the trust was allowed to fail. The testatrix in Connecticut
Bank had created a trust fund to pay the medical expenses of white pa-
tients in a certain hospital room. Not only did the court find sufficient
potential state action to raise a fourteenth amendment violation,
78
but it was also held that the trust would cause the recipient hospital
to contravene the state constitution and a state public accommodations
law enforced by criminal penalties. These latter considerations appear
in the discriminatory trust cases less frequently than might be expected,
for the very nature of many benevolent entities is to hold out services
to the community at large. 7
9
As a consequence of the above determinations, the court considered
both deviation and cy pres - properly distinguishing the two - and de-
clined to use them. The reasons have already been stated: the presence
of a gift-over to other charitable purposes, specifically to take effect
upon a finding that the trust was in violation of law. What is notable
about Connecticut Bank is some of its dicta assigning a narrow scope to
the trust saving doctrine of deviation. 80  Although the Connecticut
Bank position is clearly in the minority, at least in discrimination cases,
it is probably correct. Particularly when a trust instrument was recent-
ly drafted, as was the trust here (in 1964), it seems a bit facile to say
that "white only" was a mere incidental or a product of a less tolerant
era.
177 30 Conn. Supp. 1, 294 A.2d 586 (Super. Ct. 1972).
171 The court relied on Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), where it was held that participation
by a private hospital in the I-ill-Burton federal hospital construction program constituted
enough governmental involvement to apply the fourteenth amendment to hospital admis-
sions practices.
171 See Sweet Briar Institute v. Button. 280 F. Supp. 312 (1967), where violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to -6 (1970), were alleged but not
adjudicated.
IS0 This rule of deviation would not authorize the elimination of the restriction to
Caucasians in this bequest because the limited scope of this principle would not
permit the class of beneficiaries to be enlarged to include persons whom the
testatrix intended to exclude.
30 Conn. Supp. at 8, 294 A.2d at 592-93.
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Connecticut Bank should be seen as staking out boundaries for the
acceptable use of cy pres and deviation rather than as weakening those
doctrines. The court carefully limited its holding to the facts before it,
and evinced no intention to disturb Daggett. At most, Connecticut
Bank served as a reminder that the testamentary prerogative retains
vitality and will prevail under certain circumstances. In this regard, the
court questioned the obvious judicial willingness to unearth a general
charitable intent,'' and its skepticism is well-taken. Indeed, judicial
credibility would only be enhanced if the strong preferences for frustrat-
ing discrimination and upholding charitable trusts were more readily
acknowledged.
Georgia. The saga of the Bacon trust has already been recounted,
here and elsewhere. It is ironic that a little over three years after
the lengthy Bacon sequence came to an end in Evans v. Abney,1
8 2
the Georgia Supreme Court explained in Trammell v. Elliot s3 that
Evans had been no more than an exception to the generally successful
use of cy pres to salvage charitable trusts. The testatrix in Trammell
had intended to create scholarship funds at three named Georgia col-
leges for "deserving and qualified poor white boys and girls." The
executor of her will sought construction and the lower court struck the
racial criterion, using cy pres to maintain the trust property in the public
realm.
On appeal, the state supreme court declared that unconstitutional
government entanglement was present although only one of the three
named universities was a public school. Rather than treat them sepa-
rately, the court apparently regarded the trust fund as unitary and pro-
ceeded on that basis.
The remaining issue was the propriety of cy pres in light of the facts.
The court commendably introduced its analysis with a frank statement of
rules of construction, buttressed by statute, that favored preserving char-
itable trusts and preventing forfeitures. 18 4  Trammell made it plain that
a general charitable intent, sufficient to justify cy pres, would be pre-
sumed, absent an expression of exclusive specific intent that was "clear,
definite and unambiguous."' 18 5  Predictably, the appellant relied on
Evans v. Abney in arguing that no general charitable intent existed.
The dispatch with which Trammell distinguished and strictly narrowed
S' Court ought not to attribute to donors a nobility of purpose or loftiness of senti-
ment beyond that warranted by the evidence in order to achieve a result incon-
sistent with their intentions as expressed.
Id. at 11, 294 A.2d at 592-93.
1 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968), aff'd, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
113 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d 194 (1973).
154 The public policy expressed in these provisions favoring the validation of char-
itable trusts is supported by the long standing rule of construction of this court
by which forfeitures because of restrictive conditions attached to grants or de-
vises of property are not favored, and as well by related Code provisions immu-
nizing such trusts from the Georgia law against perpetuities.
Id. at 846, 199 S.E.2d at 198, construing GA. CODE ANN. § 85-707 (1970).
1S5 Id. at 847, 199 S.E.2d at 198-99.
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Evans to its own facts186 cannot fail to surprise those who had closely
followed the Bacon sequence. Standing on its own, however, the Tram-
mell result is consistent with the public policy announced by the court
and generally a scrupulous and progressive decision.
Texas. The Texas cases offer some interesting points of contrast to
those surveyed thus far. Although Texas achieves identical results -
discrimination precluded and trusts saved for eleemosynary ends - it has
drawn upon somewhat different theoretical sources. Most importantly,
the Texas cases have not contained an element of state action.
Coffee v. William Marsh Rice University18 7 arose when Rice Univer-
sity and its trustees sued to obtain an interpretation of the trust instru-
ment that led to the founding of the university (and which was quoted
verbatim in the school's corporate charter). The instrument stated that
the school was to provide instruction for "the white inhabitants of the
City of Houston, and State of Texas." The plaintiffs prayed for a con-
struction that would allow the admission of students without regard to
color, and alternatively, that cy pres or deviation be applied to reach
the desired end. They argued that the racial restrictions harmed the
university's reputation in the academic community and placed it at a dis-
advantage or disqualified it altogether from receiving government or
foundation grants, with the result that the founder's primary interest -
to create a greater center of learning - was not being fulfilled.
At the trial level, the case was heard by a jury which made two key
findings: (1) that the settlor had indeed intended to favor white citizens,
but that this was no longer practicable or possible; (2) that his overrid-
ing purpose had been to establish a first-class educational institution
regardless of the color of its users. The appellate court agreed with
these findings but went further, concluding that the latter finding was
correct as a matter of law. The trial court's order permitting the Univer-
sity to ignore racial criteria in its admissions policies was affirmed. 18
Coffee is a straightforward example of charitable trustees asking to
delete a trust instruction and an appropriate court complying with the
request after becoming convinced that the trust would benefit from the
change and that the change was consonant with the settlor's intentions.
The court's decision was predicated simply on its "equitable power to
18 In Evans we held that from the contents of the will, in addition to the provision
for racial restrictions on the use of a park, there was exhibited an intention on
the part of the testator which would preclude the use of such park in any manner
except that as exclusively and clearly demanded by the testator. Evans, there-
fore, upon its facts, stood for the recognized exception in the use of cy pres where-
by from the will the specific intent of the testator conclusively negated any gen-
eral charitable intention.
Id. at 847, 199 S.E.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
187 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
188 Id. at 283. Coffee also contains considerable dicta on the permissible uses of
evidence during construction of written instruments. This is a subject beyond the bounds
of this article, but it is worth a reminder here that showing or disproving charitable in-
tentions can require a skillful use of parol evidence. There are many instructive exam-
ples in Coffee.
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authorize a deviation from the terms of the trust .... .189 The court
alternatively relied on cy pres and never really clarified its theories,
although the outcome clearly did not hinge on the name the court at-
tached to its equitable power.
There is also strong dictum in Coffee in support of the discretionary
power of charitable trustees. 90 Among the discrimination cases, Cof-
fee is unique in this regard, for other decisions have not appeared to
assign any importance to the fiduciary's judgment, concentrating in-
stead on discerning the intentions of the settlor. This aspect of Coffee
would suggest that a trustee might be wise to act unilaterally to alter
the trust instructions, thereby shifting the burden of proof to those who
would challenge the actions taken.
It would seem that constitutional issues could easily have been
raised in Coffee. It is inconceivable that an institution as large as Rice
University would not have acquired enough connection with various
governmental agencies to at least make a state action claim arguable.' 9'
The cases from other jurisdictions discussed above suggest that the
quantum of state involvement that a court will require to present a four-
teenth amendment question is not large.
In Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald192 the testatrix had left property to be used
as a home for "aged white men," also giving support funds for the same
purpose. Her successor administrator requested construction and inter-
pretation of the will to determine whether the racial restriction was
valid. Heirs of the testatrix contended, inter alia, that the gift must
fail because illegal discrimination was central to the testamentary plan.
The trial court deleted the word "white" and used cy pres or "approxi-
mation" to uphold the trust. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Wooten court relied on its general equitable powers to dismiss
the racial classification as an "unenforceable word," although there was
no explanation of why it was unenforceable. The court did indicate
that there might have been a state action problem in the "administra-
tive enforcement" of the racial provisions, but that the problem had been
prevented by dropping the word "white" from the will.' 93 This would
suggest that Wooten had adopted the judicial state action doctrine of
Shelley v. Kraemer but instead of citing Shelley, the court referred to the
159 Id. at 285.
W90 hile the discretionary powers of the Trustees are not unlimited, the provi-
sions of the trust instrument clearly vest in them wide powers in determining
the method and procedure to be used in effectuating the purposes of the donor.
... This Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Trustees, and can
interfere with their exercise of discretionary powers only in case of fraud, miscon-
duct, or clear abuse of discretion.
Id. at 284.
"Il There would also be grounds for alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970):
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance.
192 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
193 Id. at 725.
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cases in the Girard College sequence," 4 which were not judicial state
action cases.
On the whole, Wooten was vague in its handling of the white-only
restriction. The court's conclusion that it possessed a "power and a
duty" to excise "an objectionable limitation contained within a charita-
ble trust"' 95 begs the question of how the limitation happened to be-
come legally "objectionable." Coffee cannot be consulted for an an-
swer because the issue did not arise there. As a result, while it is evi-
dent that racial discrimination in charitable trusts will not survive in
Texas, it is not clear why this is so.
Colorado. The Colorado cases contain no doctrine or approach not
already analyzed. Moore v. City & County of Denver' 9 involved the
construction of a testamentary instrument that had created an orphanage
for white male orphans between six and ten years of age. The trustees
petitioned the court to loosen these restrictions, but the request was
denied. In dicta, it was said that cy pres was inappropriate because the
original instructions had not become incapable of fulfillment and be-
cause the testator had evinced only a specific intent. Thirteen years
later, in Dunbar v. Board of Trustees of George W. Clayton College,19
a similar request was granted, permitting the admission of children be-
tween the ages of six and eighteen, regardless of color, and whether or
not they were orphans. Moore was distinguished summarily; essential-
ly, the Dunbar court explained that Moore did not really say what it had
plainly said.
California. In re Estate of Vanderhoofven11 and In re Estate of
Zahn '99 have already been adequately considered. Neither mentioned
a prior unreported opinion, In re Estate of Ruth Snively Walker,00
which held that appointment of a trustee willing to administer a racially
restrictive trust would constitute judicial state action, in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
Michigan. La Fond v. City of Detroit20' was analyzed previously.
New York. In re Estate of Hawley202 was decided in 1961 but has
virtually been relegated to historical interest by the flurry of cases that
"I Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Pennsylvania v. Board of Dir. of City
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
115 440 S.W.2d at 726.
"1 133 Colo. 190, 292 P.2d 986 (1956).
117 170 Colo. 327, 461 P.2d 28 (1969).
191 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 96 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971); see notes 105-08 supra and accom-
panying text.
" 16 Cal. App. 3d 106, 93 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1971); see notes 103-08 supra and accom-
paning text.
200 No. 70195, Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County, April 23, 1965.
201 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959); see notes 142-47 supra and accompanying
text.
202 32 Misc.2d 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
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followed. In Hawley the trustee of a scholarship fund at a named school
was allowed to drop requirements relating to religion and national origin
which only a decreasing number of students could meet. The court
held that the trustee had made out a sufficient case for utilization of
cy pres.
New Jersey. Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep203 preceded Hawley
and stands as the pioneer state decision in the assault upon racial and
religious discrimination in charitable trusts. The case was evaluated
earlier in this article and the critical commentary above should be
tempered by an appreciation for the difficulties inherent in being the first
to act.
20 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961); see notes 123-27 supra and accompanying text.
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